From: "Mark A. Smith"
Subject: SNET: Beat the FBI - Part 1
Date: 28 Aug 1998 12:18:25 -0400
To: L & J , SNET ,
David Rydel
-> SNETNEWS Mailing List
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[Spy & CounterSpy logo]
Providing knowledge and skills to supporters of freedom and fairness.
Copyright 1998 Lee Adams. All rights reserved. Quoting, copying, and
distributing is encouraged. (Please credit us as the source.) Links t=
o
our home page are welcome. Names of characters, corporations,
institutions, organizations, businesses, products, and services used as
examples are fictitious, except as otherwise noted herein. No resemblan=
ce
to actual individuals or entities is otherwise intended or implied.
...
[Beat the FBI]
At best, the FBI does not have a history of
respect for civil rights. Whether you are guilty o=
r
innocent doesn't matter. You are always treated th=
e
same way during an FBI investigation =96 unfairly.
Especially if surveillance is involved.
If you snooze, you lose. It's that simple. Ma=
ny
of us are sleepwalking through life. And if you
don't pay attention, then you're gonna pay =96
especially if you engage in behavior that attracts
the attention of the FBI.
Make no mistake about it, FBI surveillance
teams are lethal. They are very effective at what
they do. They have had lots of experience. They've
got massive resources. In a major investigation, 3=
0
agents watching one person is commonplace. You nev=
er
see the same agent twice. You never see the same
vehicle twice.
The FBI's triple-threat surveillance strategy
of multi-layered teams, rapid response, and manage=
d
aggression must be taken seriously.
Threat #1 =96 A multi-layered team can fool y=
ou
into thinking that the surveillance has ended. Thi=
s
is an extremely dangerous situation. They're still
lurking nearby, of course, waiting for you to say =
or
do something incriminating.
Threat #2 =96 A same-day response by the FBI
means that surveillance might begin before you're
ready for it. They'll catch you unprepared. The FB=
I
surveillance team may end up watching you trying t=
o
hide the very material that you're hoping to conce=
al
from them.
Threat #3 =96 The FBI's policy of managed
aggression can easily provoke you into losing your
temper, or your nerve, or both. It is a wicked
strategy. That's why they use it.
It's easy to see why most people are easy pre=
y
for the FBI's surveillance machine. But it doesn't
need to be that way.
Beating the FBI. There are people who routine=
ly
thwart the FBI. They know how to recognize the
telltale signature of an FBI surveillance team. Wh=
en
they find themselves under surveillance, they use
tactics that inhibit the FBI's ability to find out
what they're really doing. They mislead the FBI.
These individuals make it difficult for the F=
BI
to build a legitimate case against them. Perhaps
even more important, they make it difficult for th=
e
FBI to build a phony case against them.
An individual like this is called a hard
target. That's spy-talk for a surveillance target
who knows what he's doing.
The methods and techniques that these
individuals use are called countersurveillance. Th=
is
article reveals some of those methods and
techniques. Simply put, the article you are readin=
g
is about countersurveillance methods that will bea=
t
the FBI.
What you'll learn in this article. The articl=
e
is comprised of two parts. The first section deals
with FBI general strategy. You'll learn about the
structure and underlying principles of FBI
surveillance. They've been at this game for many
years and they've learned many lessons. The second
section of this article deals with specific tactic=
s
of FBI surveillance teams. A case study is utilize=
d
to explain and illustrate FBI behavior. It is base=
d
on direct experience and on information from
confidential sources.
--------------------------------------------------=
---
What you need to know about the FBI...
They are masters of the game. If you have
something to hide, FBI surveillance could be the
beginning of the end for you. Do not make the
mistake of underestimating the capabilities of an
FBI surveillance team. They are persistent. They a=
re
methodical. They are thorough. And they are
fanatical about their work.
Drawing from decades of experience, FBI
surveillance strategy has evolved into an advanced
system that exploits the classic military principl=
es
of space, time, and force. This strategic foundati=
on
is present in every major surveillance operation r=
un
by the FBI. This foundation relies on the three
pillars of rapid response, multi-layered teams, an=
d
managed aggression. While each of these is a serio=
us
threat to the target of a surveillance operation,
the most deadly of the three is the multi-layered
team.
--------------------------------------------------=
---
...
...
NOTE =96 There is more
to
multi-layered teams
than
we cover in this
article.
The FBI often uses
surveillance as an end
in
itself. As a method
for suppressing
dissent,
criticism, and
activism,
nothing is more
effective
than letting the
target know
that he's under
surveillance.
Fear is a powerful
tool.
To get the big picture
on
surveillance =96 and to
learn more about the
mind-games the FBI
plays =96
return to our home
page
and click on Stealth.
...
...
Multi-layered teams...
The FBI's deployment strategy is insidious an=
d
conniving, yet brilliant. Because of the manner in
which FBI agents are deployed, it is almost
impossible to catch the FBI unawares during a
surveillance operation. They always have a fall-ba=
ck
position. This is called the strategy of
surveillance-in-depth.
Here's how it works. For most surveillance
operations, the FBI actually puts two teams in the
field. That's right. Two teams.
The first team is expendable. That means if i=
t
is blown (that's spy-talk for detected), the
surveillance operation will still survive and reac=
h
its objective. This first team is called the Decoy
and Diversion Team. In this article we will refer =
to
it simply as the Decoy Team.
In surveillance operations involving hard
targets, the Decoy Team expects to get caught. In
surveillance operations involving soft targets, th=
ey
expect to remain undetected in 75% of all cases. (=
A
soft target is a person who has no
countersurveillance skills or training, and is not
on the lookout for surveillance.)
Any target who is alert =96 and on the lookou=
t
for surveillance =96 will eventually detect a pave=
ment
artist of the Decoy Team. Pavement artist is
spy-talk for a member of a surveillance team that =
is
watching you in public places. They are on foot an=
d
they are in vehicles.
At the same time that the Decoy Team enters t=
he
situation and begins surveillance on you, a second
team also enters the game. This second team quietl=
y
slips into the environment, where it does its best
to blend in with the background. This second team =
is
called the Stealth Team. At the beginning of the
operation, the Stealth Team makes no effort to wat=
ch
you. Its only objective is to establish its presen=
ce
=96 and to remain undetected.
This deployment strategy is incredibly
effective. Here's why. The first team provides cov=
er
for the second team's arrival. Even a hard target =
is
likely to be too busy watching the first team to
notice the arrival of the second team. And when bo=
th
teams are in place, you usually only notice the
first team.
The top priority of the first team (the Decoy
Team) is to see everything you do. They want to
learn your habits and your daily routine. They don=
't
want to be detected, of course, but they are
prepared to pay that price if that is what's
required in order to make sure they see absolutely
everything you are doing. Their first priority is =
to
acquire as much data about you as possible.
If you do detect the Decoy Team =96 and if th=
ey
realize you've spotted them =96 the Decoy Team sim=
ply
suspends its operations. They realize that you'll
notice their departure. In fact, they're counting =
on
it. They also realize that very few people will
realize that a second team has blended into the
background.
This second team =96 the Stealth Team =96 doe=
sn't
need to see everything you do. They have been
briefed by the first team. The Stealth Team only
needs to watch you during certain times and at
certain locations where they think you might be up
to something. The top priority of the Stealth Team
is to remain undetected. And they are prepared to
leave you unwatched for brief periods in order to
retain their invisibility. This is called picket
surveillance by the FBI, named after the gaps in a
picket fence.
This two-stage approach to major surveillance
operations is brutally effective. It has led to th=
e
ruin of many people who thought they could outfox
the FBI.
Tradecraft. The undercover agents of the
Stealth Team use methods that are more sophisticat=
ed
than those used by the Decoy Team. These methods a=
re
called tradecraft.
The Stealth Team is much more difficult to
catch than the Decoy Team. You need to know what
you're doing. It is vital that you do not let the
Stealth Team realize that you've spotted them.
That's because the best way to beat them is by
feeding them misinformation.
The difference in methods used by the two tea=
ms
is best explained by example. Numerous situations
are described in the case study later in this
article.
Layered surveillance. This concept of
multi-layered surveillance teams is the backbone o=
f
the FBI's surveillance strategy. They almost never
lead with their best team. They always hold
something back so that they have a fallback
position. This strategy is also carried over into
other FBI operations.
When the FBI is trying to infiltrate an agent
into your circle of friends, associates, coworkers=
,
and acquaintances, they'll often use an expendable
agent first. This first agent is a Decoy Agent,
meant to provide cover for the infiltration by the
second agent (the Stealth Agent).
If the first agent manages to penetrate your
organization undetected, the FBI is delighted. But
if he runs into difficulty, he is withdrawn. The
second agent =96 who has blended into the backgrou=
nd =96
is brought into play.
Why the FBI loves your lawyer. It is importan=
t
for you to realize that most lawyers have no
training in countersurveillance. This is
unfortunate. When the subject of an investigation
first realizes he is being "followed", he is angry=
=96
and outraged at the invasion of his privacy. In ma=
ny
instances, one of the things he'll do is complain =
to
his lawyer about being "followed". Many lawyers
advise their clients to "confront" the person who =
is
"following" them.
They don't realize that this is a game for
foxes, not pit bulls.
The lawyer's advice plays right into the FBI'=
s
hand. When the subject attempts to confront the
surveillance team, the FBI simply drops back into
stealth mode. The Decoy Team suspends its
surveillance activity.
Because members of the Decoy Team are
relatively easy to detect, their absence is easily
noticed. The subject assumes that his lawyer's
advice has achieved the intended effect. After all=
,
the subject confronted the people who were
"following" him and they immediately "stopped".
What the subject does not realize, of course,
is that the Stealth Team is now active. They have
been there all along, of course, as part of the
background while the Decoy Team was working. When
the Decoy Team departs, the Stealth Team is still
there as part of the background. So from the
subject's point of view, everything appears to
return to normal.
Basic psychology. The FBI surveillance team i=
s
only too willing to accommodate your emotional
desire for control over your immediate environment.
It is a fantasy that will lead to your ruin. Here'=
s
why. When you see the Decoy Team has departed, you
begin to feel safe, so you let down your guard. Yo=
u
become easy prey for the Stealth Team. Of course,
infiltration comes next =96 FBI agents penetrate y=
our
circle of friends, associates, coworkers, and
acquaintances. Arrest and indictment are simply a
question of time.
Dummy up. Here's what this means in simple
language. You can play the macho man OR you can be=
at
the FBI. You cannot have it both ways. It is an
"either-or" situation. If you insist on being a
know-it-all tough-guy confronting the people who a=
re
"following" you, the FBI is going to play you like=
a
cheap fiddle at a country hoe-down. To beat the FB=
I
you need self-control and self-discipline.
Be smart. Learn from the mistakes of others.
FBI surveillance teams do not just go away.
You don't stop wrestling a gorilla when you g=
et
tired. You stop when the gorilla gets tired.
--------------------------------------------------=
---
Rapid response...
This is the second component in the FBI's
three-pronged strategy of multi-layered teams, rap=
id
response, and managed aggression.
The width and breadth of the FBI's presence h=
as
been a closely-guarded secret up to now. Many peop=
le
do not realize that the FBI can provide same-day
response anywhere in North America. This is called
the strategy of surveillance-in-time.
In fact, the FBI can mount a same-day
surveillance operation in any city located in the
United States, Canada, or Mexico. The FBI can also
mount a same-day response in many major European
cities, most major South American cities, and some
Asian cities.
They use a skeleton crew to start. Outside
North America they sometimes farm out the work to
subcontractors.
Then, in many cases, the full surveillance
deployment arrives overnight and begins work the
next day. In situations where FBI resources are
already stretched by other major cases, it may tak=
e
two days for the full surveillance compliment to
arrive.
But make no mistake about it, surveillance ha=
s
been underway since day one. If they choose to do =
so
=96 and they often do =96 the FBI can initiate
surveillance the same day they become aware of you.
The reconnaissance factor. In many surveillan=
ce
situations, a special team is deployed to provide
reconnaissance information for the main surveillan=
ce
teams. This reconnaissance team is called the
Advance Team. The reconnaissance team is deployed
ahead of the Decoy and Stealth teams that were
discussed earlier in this article.
The Advance Team is tasked with establishing
roughly who you are, where you are, and what you'r=
e
doing. They'll take photographs of you, your home,
your office, and your vehicles. The photographs he=
lp
agents identify you on sight. The person who
secretly takes pictures of you is called a peep. T=
he
peep often arrives at your doorstep disguised as a
volunteer collecting for charity or as a religious
canvasser. (Like the CIA, the FBI is big on using
organized religion as cover for covert operations.=
)
Surreptitious entry. The primary task of the
Advance Team, however, is to break into your offic=
e
or home. This is called surreptitious entry by
spies. That's just polite talk for break-and-enter.
The break-in usually happens during the first few
days of a surveillance operation.
Once inside, they perform a quick search of
your property. They've got special ways to get
inside locked drawers and office safes. (See futur=
e
articles in Spy & CounterSpy for more on this.)
They'll often bug your office or home. Being
able to hear all your conversations gives them a
tremendous advantage. If they already know where
you're going, it makes it easier to "follow" you. =
If
they know you're going to a restaurant, for exampl=
e,
they can arrive "before" you do. The FBI's tactic =
of
being the first to arrive at your destination has
fooled many people over the years.
They'll also usually attach a tracking device
(called a beeper) to your vehicle. This makes it
easier for them to track you in traffic.
Clearly, if you are sharp enough to detect th=
e
Advance Team =96 and if you don't reveal that you'=
ve
spotted them =96 you can enjoy a major tactical
advantage over the FBI during the entire
surveillance operation. You can either cloak your
activities so they find nothing. Or you can feed
them misinformation. (See future articles in Spy &
CounterSpy for more on detecting the first
break-in.) You can also watch the behavior of the
surveillance team itself for telltale signs that
indicate they've got your home or office bugged.)
Consequences of same-day response. What's the
lesson in all this? Here's a real-world example.
Suppose you are a controversial activist group. If
you send out a news release to the media exposing
government abuse, then you'd better be prepared fo=
r
same-day surveillance by the FBI.
Not tomorrow. Not in a few days. Today.
The same advice applies if you are an
investigative journalist submitting a controversia=
l
article for publication.
The implications of same-day surveillance can
be serious. Suppose you've got documents or
materials that you relied on when writing your new=
s
release or your article. These documents might
contain references to confidential sources or
informants or whistleblowers. You don't want the F=
BI
to find these materials. You don't want to
compromise your sources.
The materials had better be securely stowed
away BEFORE you send out the news release. Trying =
to
hide the materials AFTERWARD may be too late.
Because if you think you're faster than the FBI,
you're asleep at the wheel, heading for Dead Man's
Curve. But be careful where you hide the materials.
Safes, alarm systems, even bank safe-deposit boxes
are generally useless against a determined FBI
surveillance team. (Future articles in Spy &
CounterSpy will describe how to keep information
from the FBI. It isn't easy, but it can be done.)
The FBI's capability for same-day response ha=
s
caught many surveillance targets unprepared. This =
is
not a game for slowpokes. If you don't move fast,
you're gonna be roadkill.
--------------------------------------------------=
---
...
...
NOTE =96 There is more
to
managed aggression
than
we cover in this
article.
For more on mind-games
the FBI plays, return
to
our home page and
click on Stealth.
Managed aggression...
This is the third component in the FBI's
three-pronged strategy of multi-layered teams, rap=
id
response, and managed aggression.
The FBI has a bureau-wide policy of managed
aggression. This policy also affects FBI
surveillance operations.
Surveillance teams are given specific goals.
The FBI command structure accepts no excuses. It
tolerates no failures. This strategy of
surveillance-for-results leads to aggressive
behavior in FBI surveillance teams because of the
pressure they're under. This results-driven
aggression tends to manifest itself as professiona=
l
aggression.
An FBI surveillance team is using profession=
al
aggression when it intentionally and deliberately
applies pressure to the subject of a surveillance
operation. Actions like this are called psy-ops,
which is spy-talk for psychological operations.
Here is an example of how an FBI surveillance
team will deliberately provoke you.
When you're walking through a mall or a
downtown shopping district, the surveillance team
will intentionally interfere with your route. A
pavement artist will "absent-mindedly" cross your
path, forcing you to change course to avoid walkin=
g
into him. A group of agents will "inadvertently"
obstruct your path =96 they'll be standing togethe=
r
chatting, forcing you to walk around them. Other
pavement artists will "accidentally" create
near-misses as you walk along. Some of these
"pedestrians" will create situations with a
potential for a head-on collision, forcing you to
dodge them.
As the psychological pressure continues to
build, agents may "innocently" bump into you, jost=
le
you, or step on your heel from behind. A group of
pavement artists will cue up ahead of you, creatin=
g
a line-up that delays you as you try to make a
purchase, order fast food, buy tickets, and so on.
Activity like this can quickly create
frustration, even anger, in you. But because the
incidents occur in public locations, it's difficul=
t
to prove who's behind them. You never see any agen=
t
more than once. You don't know where the next
provocation is going to come from. You're beginnin=
g
to get upset, irritated, unstable. You're more
likely to make mistakes in judgment. And that's
exactly what the surveillance team wants.
When a surveillance team is experiencing
difficulty cracking open an investigation they
sometimes resort to professional aggression. This =
is
a wicked mind-game. It can be very effective if
you're not anticipating it. The FBI surveillance
team has the power to make or break your day =96 a=
nd
they don't hesitate to use that power.
This is not a game for choirboys.
--------------------------------------------------=
---
Conclusions: FBI surveillance strategy...
The FBI's triple-threat surveillance strategy
of multi-layered teams, rapid response, and manage=
d
aggression must be taken seriously. These three
threats were mentioned at the beginning of this
article. They are important enough to be repeated.
Threat #1 =96 A multi-layered team can fool y=
ou
into thinking that the surveillance has ended. Thi=
s
is an extremely dangerous situation. They're still
lurking nearby, of course, waiting for you to say =
or
do something incriminating.
Threat #2 =96 A same-day response by the FBI
means that surveillance might begin before you're
ready for it. They'll catch you unprepared. The FB=
I
surveillance team may end up watching you trying t=
o
hide the very material that you're hoping to conce=
al
from them.
Threat #3 =96 The FBI's policy of managed
aggression can easily provoke you into losing your
temper, or your nerve, or both. It is a wicked
strategy. That's why they use it.
--------------------------------------------------=
---
...
...
[Spy & CounterSpy]
Case Study:
Beating an FBI surveillance team...
The preceding discussion provided the
background knowledge you need to begin beating the
FBI. But the real value of this article lays in th=
e
section you're reading now =96 the case study. Tha=
t's
because the case study is based on actual events.
The background. The author resides in a city
where a joint USA-Canadian defense research facili=
ty
was located. It developed anti-submarine warfare
systems. This meant a community with active
espionage and surveillance operations.
The author was under hostile surveillance for
eight years. (See About Us for more on this.) In
order to strengthen his countersurveillance skills=
,
the author hit on the idea of provoking other
agencies into conducting surveillance against him.
Much like the way hackers break into computer
systems, the author hacked surveillance operations.
The situation. The author sent a letter by
commercial courier to the head of
counterintelligence at FBI headquarters in
Washington DC. The letter offered to provide
information about the countersurveillance
capabilities of the FBI's adversaries.
The following discussion describes part of wh=
at
happened next. The case study is a compilation of
incidents that occurred during surveillance
operations mounted by the FBI over a one-year
period.
The incidents have been organized into four
episodes for easier reading. Events are reported i=
n
the present tense using the first person singular.
This reporting style provides a more authentic
portrayal of what it feels like to use
countersurveillance in an adversarial environment.
--------------------------------------------------=
---
Case Study section begins...
The setup. Before sending the letter, I
establish a personal routine that makes it easier
for me to detect surveillance. When driving, I
choose the same times along the same routes. I
select busy streets and quiet streets. I study the
timing of traffic lights. I observe the driving
habits of other motorists. I learn vantage points
where observers might lurk.
Then I go through the same exercise for my
pedestrian routes.
I establish a lifestyle that will capture the
attention of a surveillance team. I want them to
focus on certain aspects of my behavior. I choose
social activities that offer situations where spie=
s
will suspect "secret contacts" are taking place. I
study the venues, people, and events that are
normally part of these situations. I begin to fit
in.
I become a creature of habit at home and at m=
y
office. I store items in particular ways. I allow
dust to accumulate in some locations, while others
are kept meticulously clean. I hide mildly
incriminating documents for the FBI to "find". I
tune myself to the feel of the locks in my life =96
doors, desks, filing cabinets, office safe, person=
al
vehicle, and so on.
My goal is to know my environment. I want to =
be
able to detect the arrival of the surveillance tea=
m
=96 no matter how silently they stalk their prey.
--------------------------------------------------=
---
...
...
To get the big picture
on surveillance =96 and
to
put this Case Study
into
perspective =96 return
to
our home page and
click on Stealth.
Episode 1: Reconnaissance =96
The FBI's Advance Team
Day Zero, 1:00 pm, Wednesday afternoon =96 Th=
e
FedEx=AE truck arrives to pick up the letter. I've
already got the waybill prepared. For $24.50 they
guarantee next-day delivery. The driver tells me I=
'm
his last pickup on his way out to the airport. My
package will be going out on the 1:30 flight.
Day One, 2:00 pm, Thursday afternoon =96 I ca=
ll
FedEx and I ask about package 400-7033-0341. The
package has been delivered. My letter is now in th=
e
hands of the Assistant Director, National Security=
,
Federal Bureau of Investigation, #7110 =96 935
Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Washington DC, 20535-001.
4:30 pm, later that afternoon =96 I decide I'=
ll
go out later for the evening. I won't have that ma=
ny
more chances to relax. It's already Thursday. I'm
expecting surveillance to begin Monday.
9:15 pm, later that evening =96 After a meal =
at
The S----- ------ restaurant downtown, I'm driving
out to The W------, a working class bar in the
suburbs. They've got karaoke on Thursday nights. T=
he
crowds they get there love classic rock and countr=
y.
That suits me fine. I like to sing rock'n'roll.
As I turn left off Gorge Road onto Admirals
Road, something behind me catches my attention. Th=
is
is normally a quiet stretch of road this time of
night. It's early March, too dark to see anything
but headlights. The vehicle behind me is maintaini=
ng
a constant distance.
Unusual. Most motorists drive 5 or 10 mph ove=
r
the limit here.
"Unmarked police car," I tell myself. I glanc=
e
at the speedometer. Bang on the legal limit. I mak=
e
a note to watch my driving habits anyway.
A mile later I go through a choke-point and
merge onto Sooke Road. My follower turns away. He =
is
replaced by another vehicle maintaining a fixed
distance. After years of surveillance I see things
like this. I can't turn it off any more.
"That's not how traffic cops work," I caution
myself.
I don't have enough data yet, but I'm already
figuring somebody might have me under surveillance.
But who? I don't want any third party messing up t=
he
ambush that I have laid for the FBI.
10:15 pm, same evening =96 Two songs later at=
The
W-------. The place is only half full, but it's
rocking. There are 60, maybe 70, people in the
place. A swarthy mixture of working-class folks,
with a sprinkling of biker types. A rough crowd, b=
ut
good people at heart. You get the picture. They
don't put on airs or dress up. Hey, when you do wh=
at
I do, you learn to fit in anywhere.
I'm sitting with a couple of women at a table
at the far end of the room from the entrance. The
karaoke stage is to my right. The music is loud. T=
he
place smells of beer and sweat. A honky-tonk kind =
of
place. Between singers the MC is doing a pretty go=
od
job working up the crowd.
A thirtyish guy walks in =96 physically fit,
clean shaven, a trim haircut, slacks, brown leathe=
r
Bomber jacket, slightly overdressed for the joint.
He looks the place over. He doesn't make
eye-contact, but he seems to be keying on me. He
chooses a seat that gives him a clear line-of-sigh=
t
=96 right to where I'm sitting with Diana and
Kimberley.
I make a note to myself. Run some surveillanc=
e
tests tomorrow. I hear the MC calling my name over
the speakers. My song is up next. Okay, now we roc=
k,
I tell myself.
Day Two, 10:30 am, the next morning =96 It's =
a
nice sunny day. It seldom gets cold enough for sno=
w
here. I decide against going into the office.
Instead I plan to go downtown, pay a few bills, pi=
ck
up mail at the PO box. I'll use routes that will
provide opportunities to check for surveillance =96
vehicle or pedestrian, or both.
Instead of taking a direct route over to the
mall on Hillside Avenue, I take the long way aroun=
d.
I drive through Mt. Douglas Park. It's picturesque
and rugged =96 full of old Douglas Fir trees. Fist=
s of
gray rock thrust up through the moss that covers t=
he
forest floor.
The main road through the park snakes along t=
he
sea coast. There's a straight stretch, though,
notorious for speeders. But I'm in no hurry. The s=
un
is flaring through the fir trees, blasting lines o=
f
shadows across the road like zebra stripes. It's
hypnotic. I check the mirror. The vehicle behind m=
e
is holding the same fixed distance since before I
entered Mount Doug.
I can't help thinking about last night. Same
style, same team? Hmm. Am I beginning to see a
pattern? I warn myself about jumping to premature
conclusions.
10:55 am, same morning =96 Inside the mall, I
head for B---- Books. They've got a good selection
of computer books. I zero in on the titles for
programmers. I used to write this stuff myself and
I'm still interested in it.
Then I get my first break. (I don't mind
admitting that it cuts both ways =96 you have to b=
e
lucky to be good, and you have to be good to be
lucky.)
I've been on the lookout for signs of foot
surveillance, but I haven't seen anything odd yet.
The book store is relatively quiet =96 maybe twent=
y
customers in the place, and it's a sizable place.
There are two or three other customers near me, bu=
t
they're a few aisles over, either behind me or in
front.
A woman, thirtyish, plain, walks in and comes
over to the section I'm in. She's checking out boo=
ks
at the end of my aisle, about four or five paces
from me. She squats down to go through the titles =
on
the bottom row. I've seen this squatting behavior
before in spooks =96 they use it to throw you off =
by
changing their profile, appearing less threatening.
But that doesn't mean everyone who squats is a
pavement artist. By itself, it means nothing. It
only counts if it's part of a larger pattern of
behavior.
But while I've been watching her, a male has
arrived behind me. He's about three paces away. He=
's
wearing a businessman's suit and tie. You don't se=
e
many programmers wearing suits.
The clerk catches him completely off guard. S=
he
approaches from behind. She offers to help him fin=
d
whatever he's looking for. In fact, she insists on
it. She proceeds to engage him in conversation.
And he chokes. Big time.
He doesn't know anything about programming. O=
r
computer languages. Or applications. Absolutely zi=
p.
Nuttin' at all. And the more the clerk presses him=
,
the less he knows. I can't believe my good luck.
Keep in mind there's maybe twenty people in t=
he
whole place, spread out evenly throughout the book
store. Except for the section on computer
programming books. Where there are now four of us
crammed together.
And I'm starting to consider all the angles.
Hmm, if the squatting female was an agent, maybe s=
he
was providing cover for the male. It takes resourc=
es
to run operations like that. Could this be the FBI=
?
Already? Did they initiate surveillance last night=
?
The same day they received the courier package?
Aw, come on. Nobody's that good.
I've seen enough here. I leave the book store.
I head for my car. I've got some errands to take
care of downtown. Besides, I need more empirical
evidence before I can draw any conclusions. What
happens next is a jolt. Literally.
11:20 am, same morning =96 I pull out of the =
mall
parking lot, turn right on Hillside Avenue, and
point my Mazda=AE 626 towards downtown. Two miles =
down
the road I ease into the left-turn lane as I
approach Quadra Street.
The light is red. I come to a full stop.
The car behind me doesn't.
It's a mild collision =96 the impact is barel=
y
stiff enough to skid my car ahead a few inches. I
glance at the mirror. Two young fellas, laughing,
kidding around =96 not paying as much attention as
they should.
Off comes the seatbelt and I'm out of the car=
,
stepping around back to check for damage. The driv=
er
pokes his head out the window. He's still laughing.
He apologizes, says he hopes there's no damage. He=
's
the friendly type, all smiles, genuinely sorry. He=
y,
how can you not like a guy like that?
I can't see any damage. I spin on my heels an=
d
head back to my car. He yells out another sorry. I
toss him a no-hard-feelings wave as I slide back
into the Mazda.
The light flips green. I turn left onto Quadr=
a.
I'm already replaying it in my head. Was there any
way I could have avoided the collision? Maybe slow
down a little earlier? Give him a little more
warning?
The driver in front of me slows to make a lef=
t
turn. He hesitates, changes his mind, and proceeds
straight on. At the next corner he slows again. Sa=
me
thing. What's wrong with this guy? Finally, at the
third corner he makes his left turn. Good riddance=
,
jerk.
A few blocks later =96 it's another idiot. He
can't decide which lane he wants. He starts to
change lanes, goes back, ends up straddling both.
Get out of my way, dolt.
Then =96 zzzap!
"Look at all the lousy drivers I'm
encountering," I think to myself. Yeah, right.
Right after I left the mall. Right after the
book store thing. Right after the spook in the boo=
k
store had his cover blown by the clerk. With me
standing next to him.
Nasty traffic. Yeah, right. They're trying to
recover from their blunder. This traffic stuff is =
a
diversion. They're trying to salvage their
surveillance operation. They hope to distract me =96
force me into a different mind set =96 stop me
thinking about what happened in the book store.
Professional aggression, I'm telling myself.
I've seen it in other surveillance teams. Usually
not this rough, though.
The trick is to detach yourself from what's
happening to you. Then you can put it in
perspective. Most targets would still be fuming ov=
er
the collision. And would have completely forgotten
the book store incident.
These guys are good, I tell myself. Very good.
We're talking advanced psychology here.
I remind myself not to leap to hasty
conclusions. But if I'm right =96 and I'm beginnin=
g to
think I am =96 if indeed this is a surveillance
operation =96 then I can expect to start seeing mo=
re
of the pattern.
As I begin to enter the downtown section of t=
he
city, I steel myself for what's coming next. Whoev=
er
they are, these guys play for keeps. I cannot rely
on luck anymore. The book store thing was a freak
event. I need to make my own luck.
It's time to begin using active
countersurveillance.
--------------------------------------------------=
---
... Coming up next in the Case Study...
In Part 2 of the Case Study you'll learn how
... the pavement artists of the FBI advance team were
detected while the author was running errands
[Spy & CounterSpy] downtown. You'll see the countersurveillance
technique he used to provoke a response that
betrayed the presence of the surveillance team.
Arriving back home, the author was able to
detect circumstantial trace evidence of a break-in.
You'll see how he systematically and meticulously
laid the groundwork for exposing the existence of
bugs in his office and in his home.
Then you'll see how the author unmasked the
peep =96 an FBI photographer tasked with building =
a
dossier enabling other FBI agents to recognize the
author on sight.
In Part 3 of the Case Study you see the FBI
Decoy Team enter the game and take over the
surveillance operation. You'll see how the author
picks apart their operation, exposing their stakeo=
ut
tactics, revealing the covers that their agents us=
e,
and detecting their observation posts.
In Part 4 the Decoy Team withdraws and the
Stealth Team takes over. The author shows you the
differences between the two surveillance operation=
s.
You'll learn how to see through the veil of
deception used by the FBI.
Future articles in Spy & Counterspy will expo=
se
the tactics that the FBI uses for infiltration and
penetration. You'll learn about the two-stage and
three-stage setups that have led to the ruin of ma=
ny
surveillance targets.
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Spy & CounterSpy is published by Here's-how, Right-now! Seminars Inc. H=
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