From: jeremy.compton@stonebow.otago.ac.nz (Jeremy Compton)
Subject: SNET: Background to Terrorism
Date: 26 Aug 1998 10:50:16 -0400
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In article <35E2C0AF.DE280E02@igc.org>, Ralph McGehee 
writes
>                A Background to Terrorism
>
>Ralph McGehee
>CIABASE
>
>  Afghanistan, Pakistan, Egypt,  80-96 Blowback of CIA ops. CIA spent more
>  than $3 billion dollars in 80s to train and fund the Afghan resistance --
>  most venomously anti-Western -- they form core of an international net of
>  Islamic militants. CIA weaponry went to fundamentalist Gulbaddin Hekmatyar,
>  one of the most anti-western leaders and until recently president of
>  Afghanistan. His allies included Sheikh Omar Abdel Rahman, serving life in
>  the U.S. for urban terrorism. Rami Ahmed Yousef, man accused of planning
>  the bombing of the World Trade Center was trained in Afghanistan. The
>  terrorist net has targeted Washington's most pivotal Islamic allies --
>  claiming responsibility for the first terrorist attack in Saudi Arabia and
>  some of the worst attacks in Pakistan. Christian Science Monitor 11/1/96 18
>
>  Middle East, Afghanistan, Pakistan,  81-92  Support for Afghan members of,
>  Ikhwan, a frequently violent Muslim brotherhood. Saddam Hussein of Iraq and
>  Khadafi of Libya also supported more fanatic factions of Afghan Mujahaddin
>  -- but largest contributor of Gulbaddin Hekmatyar came from CIA. Huge
>  amounts of U.S. aid also to Ahmed Shah Masood of Rabbani's Jamiat-I-Islami,
>  both longtime advocates of pan-Islam. Lohbeck, K. (1993). Holy War,
>  Unholy Victory  171
>
>  Afghanistan, Pakistan, USSR,  80-90  In 1987 the broad
>  percentages of material allocated to the Islamic fundamentalist parties was
>  between 67-73 per cent. Allocations to the parties were: Hekmatyar 18-20
>  per cent, Rabbani 18-19 per cent, Sayaf 17-18 per cent, Khalis 13-15 per
>  cent, Nabi 13-15 per cent, Gailani 10-11 per cent, and Mujaddadi 3-5 per
>  cent. Mohammad Yousai & Adkin, M. (1992). The Bear Trap: Afghanistan's
>  Untold Story 97,105,215
>
>  Afghanistan, Pakistan,  80-93  U.S. created a monster by supporting a
>  rebellion based on religious zealotry. Several of those involved in World
>  Trade Center bombing or plans to attack other targets participated in the
>  Afghan rebellion as recruiters, trainers, or fighters. Abdel Rahman was
>  reportedly a prolific recruiter per reports from Cairo. An Afghan link
>  extends as well to a number of accused terrorists in Egypt, Algeria, and
>  other Arab countries. Through Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence
>  organization (ISI), CIA provided weapons, money and training for Afghan
>  insurgents. Dispute over giving Stinger missiles. Morton Abramowitz,
>  Director of the State Department's INR, now president of the Carneige
>  Endowment for International Peace, was the leading advocate for supplying
>  Stingers. CIA now seeking $55 million to purchase missiles
>  that showing up on black market. Pakistan's ISI favored Hekmatyar -
>  Pakistan agent for years - he now is prime minister of Afghanistan.
>  Peshawar was center for insurgency/extremists and now they looking for
>  new targets - such as the pro-West government in Egypt.
>  Washington Times 7/26/93 a1,13
>
>  Afghanistan,  79-90  Mohammad Yousaf & Adkin, M. (1992). The Bear Trap:
>  Afghanistan's Untold Story. London, England: Leo Cooper. The book outlines
>  CIA's support operation for the Mujaheddin in Afghanistan via Pakistan's
>  Inter-Service Intelligence (ISI), Pakistan's CIA. ISI funneled 70 per cent
>  of all material aid -- money, uniforms, weapons, including Stinger
>  missiles, and demolitions -- to radical Islamic fundamentalists. Now
>  radical Islamic fundamentalism is our major problem. CIABASE
>  report, Crisis of Democracy. 5/1/95
>
>  Afghanistan, Pakistan,  80-94  Covert CIA program to buy back U.S. Stinger
>  missiles distributed to rebel forces in 80s plagued by failures,
>  miscalculations and wasted money. Congress authorized more than $65 million
>  for op over last 3 years. Despite the millions, CIA has recovered only a
>  fraction and does not know who controls remaining weapons. Missiles
>  supplied by CIA have turned up in Iran, Qatar and North Korea. Op turned
>  into a fish market "CIA unable to recover most of the missiles." One effort
>  failed when Pakistani officials stormed into Afghanistan and seized the
>  missiles - Afghan rebel chief so incensed his men kidnapped 2 (Chinese)
>  engineers working with the Pakistani government and holds them for ransom.
>  Foul-ups legendary in intelligence circles in Pakistan and tribal leaders in
>  Afghanistan. Washington Post 3/7/94 a1,14
>
>  Afghanistan, Pakistan, 86 In March 86 U.S. began giving Stinger missiles
>  to the Mujaheddin. Shift occurred after activists in Pentagon, and CIA backed
>  by conservative senators, overcame opposition. Opponents argued that
>  introducing U.S.-made arms into third world conflicts would escalate into
>  U.S.-USSR conflicts and there no guarantee advanced weapons would not fall
>  into terrorist hands. British Blowpipes also used. Washington Post 7/23/86
>  a1,12
>
>  Afghanistan,  90  Afghan guerrillas veto drive for Kabul. Pakistan's
>  Inter-Services intelligence agency (ISI) preparing for offensive on
>  Kabul to be led by Gulbaddin Hekmatar, a radical Moslem fundamentalist.
>  ISI controls distribution of CIA and Saudi-supplied weapons. Aborted
>  offensive reveals difference between CIA and the Department of State.
>  State argued against assault, CIA officers urged the assault.
>  Washington Post 11/4/90 a27,28
>
>  Afghanistan, Pakistan  80-90  Two part article based on information from
>  intelligence officials: Pakistani General Mohammed Yousaf who wrote book
>  "The Bear Trap;" and more than a dozen senior western officials. Three
>  training camps near Afghan border where Mujaheddin fire heavy weapons and
>  learn to make bombs with CIA-supplied plastic explosives. DCI Casey in 84,
>  during visit convinced Pakistanis to ship propaganda through Afghanistan to
>  USSR Muslim southern republics. CIA supplied thousands of Korans, as well as
>  books on USSR atrocities. U.S. "chickened-out" on taking Afghan war into
>  Soviet soil but Casey ruthless. Intel coup triggered decision to escalate.
>  U.S. received highly specific, sensitive info re USSR war plans in
>  Afghanistan. 3/85 NSDD 166, sharply escalated U.S. op by providing high
>  technology military expertise. In 85 CIA gave extensive satellite
>  reconnaissance data, plans for military ops based on satellite intelligence,
>  intercepts of USSR communications, nets for rebels, delayed timing devices
>  for tons of plastic explosives for urban sabotage, long-range sniper rifles,
>  a targeting device for mortars linked to U.S. navy satellite, wire-guided
>  anti-tank missiles, and Stinger missiles, etc. Washington Post 7/19/92 a1,6
>
>  Afghanistan, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, China, USSR,  80-90  first years
>  of the Reagan Administration, covert Afghan war handled out of (DCI)
>  Casey's back pocket. By 85 U.S. increase in U.S. arms supplies - rose to
>  65,000 tons annually by 87 as well as a ceaseless stream of CIA and P
>  Pentagon specialists to ISI Headquarters near Rawalpindi who helped plan ops
>  by as many as 11 ISI teams trained and supplied by CIA who accompanied
>  Mujaheddin across border. Teams attacked airports, railroads, fuel depots,
>  electricity pylons, bridges and roads.  Washington Post 7/19/92 a1,6
>
>  Pakistan, Afghanistan,  81-92  A basic course on Who's Who of Mujahaddin.
>  Lohbeck, K. (1993). Holy War, Unholy Victory  6-4
>
>  Afghanistan, Germany,  86  A Kuwaitian is trained in explosives, gets false
>  Afghanistan papers made by the CIA in the Frankfurt Headquarters (Dept. of
>  Army Detachment), is flown to Pakistan, goes from there to Afghanistan. Der
>  Speigel 10/6/86.
>
>  Afghanistan,  79-90  Mujaheddin commanders inside Afghanistan control huge
>  fields of opium poppies and reap harvest of as much as four million pounds
>  of opium a year. By 89 Afghanistan and Pakistan produced as much heroin as
>  rest of world combined. Weiner, T. (1990). Blank Check: The Pentagon's
>  Black Budget 151-152
>
>  Afghanistan,  82  Sales of opium fund Afghan rebels. The DEA said
>  52% of the heroin brought into the U.S. last year is believed to have come
>  from the area of Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iran. U.S. policy contradictory
>  it wants to fight the drug traffic and to drive the USSR out of
>  Afghanistan. 250 to 300 tons opium were produced in Afghanistan in 1981 .
>  That quantity could be converted into 25 to 30 tons of heroin. Processing
>  done in Pakistan. Drug traffickers in U.S. import 4 to 4 1/2 tons of heroin
>  a year. Washington Post 12/17/83
>
>  Afghanistan,  86  a Department of State report describes Afghanistan and
>  the bordering tribal areas of Pakistan as "the world's leading source of
>  illicit heroin exports to the US and Europe. The sale of this opium plays
>  an important part in the finances of the CIA-backed Afghan rebels.
>  New York Times 6/20/86 from Intel Parapolitics 9/86 p7
>
>  Afghanistan,  89  The Administration is dickering over how best to arm the
>  Mujahedeen. Areas controlled by them include some of the most fertile
>  centers of opium production. DOS report circa 3/89 said Afghanistan produced
>  700 to 800 metric tons of opium 88, most from territory held by rebels.
>  Representative Bill McCollum hit CIA over handling of mujahedeen and
>  working through Pakistan's intelligence service. The Nation 10/16/89 412
>
>  Afghanistan, Iran, Pakistan. (Golden Crescent) accounts for 75% all heroin
>  in U.S. In 1983 4.5 tons heroin came to the U.S. from the Golden Crescent.
>  Covert Action Information Bulletin (now Covert Action Quarterly) Summer 87 11
>
>  Afghanistan, Pakistan,  80-90  17 DEA agents assigned to the U.S. embassy in
>  Islamabad. DEA reports identified 40 significant narcotics syndicates in
>  Pakistan. Despite high quality of DEA intelligence, not a major syndicate
>  investigated by Pakistani police in a decade. Hekmatyar himself controlled
>  six heroin refineries. Without fear of arrest heroin dealers began
>  exporting product to Europe and America, capturing more than 50% of both
>  markets. When Pakistani police picked up Hamid Hasnain, V.P. of gvt's Habib
>  bank, they found in his briefcase the personal records of president Zia.
>  Blatant official corruption continued until General Zia's death in an
>  air crash. Typical of misinformation that blocked any U.S. action against
>  Pakistan's heroin trade, the State Department's semi-annual narcotics review
>  in September called General Zia a strong supporter of anti-narcotics
>  activities in Pakistan. McCoy, A.W. (1991). The Politics Of Heroin: CIA
>  Complicity in the Global Drug Traffic 456
>
>  Afghanistan, Pakistan, 85-90  U.S. government avoids investigating drug
>  trade run by Afghan resistance movement. Government has info re heroin deals
>  Gulbaddin Hekmatjar, leader of mujaheddin but takes no action. Barnett Rubin
>  of Yale based on Washington Post story: "people attempting research this
>  connection receive hardly any support. Our relationship with Pakistani
>  military is centerpiece our strategic presence in Southern Asia and even in
>  the Persian Gulf." Article outlines movement of weapons and drugs via
>  Pakistani ISI and the National Logistic Cell (NLC) entirely owned by
>  Pakistani army. top secret s/a-90 17-18
>
>  From about  48-91  CIA involved in drug traffic at 3 levels: 1)
>  coincidental Complicity through covert alliances with groups actively engaged
>  in drugs; 2) support of traffic by covering up for drug lord allies; 3)
>  active engagement in transport of opium and heroin. From Burma's opium
>  traffic in 50s and growth of golden triangle in sea in 60s and 70s U.S.
>  role a catalyst. in 5/80 Dr. David Musto, angry. In late 77 he was on
>  Carter's White House Strategy Council on Drug Abuse. Next two years CIA
>  and other intelligence agencies denied Council access to all classified info
>  on drug traffic. CIA lied about dollar role of drugs. Dr. Joyce Lowinson
>  another Council member in New York Times op-ed criticized policy. Both Musto
>  and Lowinson worried about drugs in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Drug
>  Enforcement Agency investigated surge of drugs from southern Asia. Drug
>  traffic in U.S. in large part due to failure Drug Enforcement Agency's
>  interdiction and CIA's covert ops. CIA ops transformed southern Asia to
>  major supplier of world heroin. By 1988 there an estimated 100 to 200 heroin
>  refineries in the Kyber district alone. Trucks from Pakistani army's
>  logistics with CIA arms often returned loaded with heroin - protected with
>  papers from Pakistan's ISI. Drug Enforcement Agency said there were 40
>  significant narcotics syndicates in Pakistan. Annual earnings $8 to 10
>  billion. Progressive 7/91 20-26. From Alfred McCoy's book, Politics Of
>  Heroin: CIA Complicity in Global drug trade, a revised edition to be
>  published in July 1991
>
>  Drug Enforcement Agency December  83 says Afghanistan rebels are financing
>  their battle at least partially through sale opium, some of which comes to
>  U.S. in form of heroin. David Melodic, Drug Enforcement Agency's
>  congressional liaison said 52% of heroin brought into
>  U.S. last year believed to have come from area of Afghanistan, Pakistan and
>  Iran. American interests Afghanistan contradictory over fighting drug
>  traffic and political goals. Washington Post 12/17/83
>
>  Pakistan, Afghanistan,  79-89  The Mujahedden rebels keep their cause going
>  through the sale of opium. Drug Enforcement Agency spokesman said "no less
>  than half of all U.S. heroin came from that area of the world." Gulbaddin
>  Hekmatyar is responsible for murdering hundreds of dedicated resistance
>  fighters, political workers, and intellectuals. He reportedly was a leading
>  figure in the heroin trade. Details of corruption emerged from U.S. sources
>  only after the Soviets began pulling out of Afghanistan. By 1989, Pakistan
>  had no fewer than 100 heroin labs near the border of Afghanistan. CIA had
>  used a Lebanese-controlled currency firm in Zurich, Shakarchi Trading to
>  channel aid to the Afghan rebels. Marshall, j. (1991). drug Wars 49-52
>
>  Southern Asia,  80-90  during 80s CIA ops in Afghanistan transformed
>  South Asia from a self-contained opium zone to major supplier heroin on
>  the world market. Saudi Arabia delivered their aid directly to client
>  guerrilla groups inside Afghanistan, most allied agencies, the CIA
>  included, worked through General Zia's [of Pakistan], Inter Service Intel
>  (ISI). CIA relationship with ISI complex, CIA commanded vast arsenal of funds
>  and high-tech weapons that dwarfed ISI's meager budget. McCoy, A.W. (1991).
>  the Politics Of Heroin: CIA Complicity in the Global Drug Traffic 49
>
>  Pakistan-Afghanistan border and Iran,  81 the Golden Crescent area where
>  most heroin coming into U.S. in book "Weltmacht Droge" Austrian journalist
>  Hans Georg Behr shows the connection between aid provided by Western
>  intelligence agencies and increased heroin shipping to West. He spent two
>  weeks with Afghan rebels who smuggling opium to Pakistan. Money exchanged
>  for arms.  Counterspy 10/81 29-30
>
>  Pakistan, Afghanistan,  84 Bush meets with the leader of Pakistan's
>  Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate and Bush agreed for 3.2 billion in
>  new US aid over and above the 2 billion allocated to the Afghan op. Yet by
>  1984, according to European police sources, Pakistan was furnishing 70% of
>  the world's supply of high-grade heroin. CIA's arms pipeline to Afghan
>  mujahedeen is organized and coordinated by Pakistan's Inter-Services
>  Intelligence. The main carrier is the national logistic cell, owned by the
>  Pakistan army, it is the largest transport org in the country. US has 17
>  officers in Pakistan who work exclusively on narcotics. The DEA contingent
>  includes several CIA officers. CIA has gathered intelligence on narcotics
>  since 75. European police who work with DEA claim that US agents have
>  identified 40 significant narcotics syndicates in Pakistan yet none have
>  been broken up in past ten years. Nation article gives a background
>  paragraph on the history of CIA ops and drug traffic.
>  The Nation 11/14/88 477,492,94-6
>
>  Afghanistan, Pakistan,  86-87  CIA supplying counterfeit Afghan money for
>  several years.  It acquired an excellent set of plates without a blemish.
>  CIA bills arrive in Pakistan and are sold for full value in Peshawar and
>  Quetta. Jack Anderson, Washington Post 5/4/87
>
>  81-92  Afghanistan, Pakistan,  81-92  Because of relationship between DCI
>  Casey and General Acktar, CIA became advisor and supplier of aid to
>  Mujahaddin. CIA personnel in Pakistan, were notoriously unlearned in culture
>  and political atmosphere of Afghans. CIA supported Gulbaddin and Ahmed Ahah
>  Masood at the expense of other Afghans who had a much broader-based
>  constituency.  Lohbeck, K. (1993). Holy War, Unholy Victory  163
>
>  Afghanistan,  76-89  A criticism of the CIA's handling of the op in
>  Afghanistan by Bill McCollum, Republican congressman from Florida and
>  chairman of a GOP task force on terrorism and unconventional warfare. After
>  10 years and nearly $2 billion in American aid culminating in a
>  monumentally incompetent program of arms procurement and distribution.
>  Hekmatyar's party - recipient of much of much of the aid - implicated in
>  dozens of disappearances and outright murders of rival commanders and
>  Afghan intellectuals. Hekmatyar loyal to Pakistan's ISI that acts as a
>  proxy for CIA. Washington Post 9/10/89 c-1,4
>
>  USSR, Pakistan, Afghanistan,  82-87  DCI Casey renewed acquaintance with
>  General Acktar Abdul Rahman Khan. During tenure Casey made 6 trips to
>  coordinate with Acktar. Casey considered himself commander-in-chief against
>  USSR in Afghan. Within 2 years after 1st visit, CIA station in Islamabad
>  became largest in world outside of Langley Headquarters. Lohbeck, K.
>  (1993). Holy War, Unholy Victory  52
>
>  Afghanistan, Pakistan,  81-92  Reed Irvine of Committee for a Free
>  Afghanistan, and Andy Eiva, started a letterhead org called Afghan-American
>  Federation. Federation helpful in finding doctors and hospitals that would
>  take severely wounded. Committee also hired people to advise the Mujahaddin
>  military. One was Ted Mataksis who also advised re Central America and
>  Cambodian rebels. Lohbeck, K. (1993). Holy War, Unholy Victory
>
>  Afghanistan, Pakistan, USSR,  60-90  ISI's Headquarters in a large camp of
>  70-80 acres north of Rawalpindi, 12 kilometers from Islamabad. Inside high
>  walls were offices, transit warehouse through which passed 70 percent of all
>  arms and ammo for the Mujahideen, at least 300 vehicles, several acres of
>  training area, a psywar unit, barracks, messhalls and the Stinger training
>  school. This called Ojhri camp. General Akhtar set up another organization
>  for the provision of clothing and rations purchased in huge quantities
>  throughout Pakistan, with CIA money. Major contribution from CIA to
>  Afghan war was satellite intelligence through photographs. Mohammad Yousai &
>  Adkin, M. (1992). the Bear Trap: Afghanistan's Untold Story 27,29, 93
>
>  Afghanistan, Pakistan, USSR,  80-90  There were seven Afghan resistance
>  parties formed into an alliance. Political heads of each party called a
>  leader to distinguish from the Mujahideen military commanders. Alliance
>  established after 83. until the Quetta incident, commanders usually received
>  supplies directly from ISI. Supplies then channeled through the parties.
>  Gulbadin Hekmatyar is the youngest and toughest of alliance leaders. Mohammad
>  Yousai & Adkin, M. (1992). the Bear Trap: Afghanistan's Untold Story 40-1
>
>  Afghanistan, Pakistan,  85-92  Islamic fundamentalist Gulbaddin Hekmatyar
>  per General Yousaf by 87 received only about 20% of annual allocations of
>  money and weapons. All 4 fundamentalist parties combined received 75%,
>  leaving small amounts for the three moderate parties. U.S. covert program
>  in Afghanistan effectively ended 1/1/92. Program a success. Washington Post
>  7/20/92 a1,12
>
>  Afghanistan, Pakistan, USSR,  80-90  A discussion of the weapons and
>  equipment pipeline. It in three distinct parts with the CIA owning the
>  first part, the purchase and transport of weapons to Pakistan. Second part
>  ISI's responsibility - getting everything carried across Pakistan,
>  allocated to, and handed over to the parties at their Headquarters near
>  Peshawar and Quetta. The third leg was the parties allocated weapons to
>  their commanders and distributed inside Afghanistan. On 1987 the broad
>  percentages allocated to the parties were Hekmatyar 18-20 percent, Rabbani
>  18-19 per cent, Sayaf 17-18 per cent, Khalis 13-15 percent, Nabi 13-15
>  percent, Gailani 10-11 percent, and Mujaddadi 3-5 percent. Fundamentalists
>  received a total of 67-73 percent. Mohammad Yousai & Adkin, M. (1992). The
>  Bear Trap: Afghanistan's Untold Story 97, 105
>
>





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