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Virtual Reality: Consciousness Really Explained!
(Why, How, Where and What: A Radical Proposal)
(copyright April, 1994)
by
Jerome Iglowitz
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PART ONE OF THREE. Preface and Part 1 of Chapter 1, (split
for transmission). CONVERTED TO ASCII, ALL FORMATTING AND
FOOTNOTES LOST -AND I TEND TO USE FAIRLY EXPANSIVE
FOOTNOTES -HELP! (WORDPERFECT 4.1 ON AN AMIGA)
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PREFACE
Is anyone really interested in an answer to the mind-
body problem? And why should anyone be? If science one
day is able to deal with all of the ravages of mental
illness, and to explain the whole of human behavior as
biological phenomena -as it surely will- then the problem
would seem to devolve to one of words only, fit for the
debates of philosophers with philosophers alone, and of
interest to no one else.
But, as in science generally, there is also a problem of
organization - how do we organize these biological
phenomena? And more -how do we predict and integrate
biological and behavioral function? It is one thing to
catalogue prior experiment, and it is another to integrate
it into a comprehensive and predictive framework useful to
empiric practice. Ptolomean vs. Copernican cosmology is
the prototypical example of this problem.
There is a fundamental prejudice in the history of human
thought: it is that the large-scale organization of reality
is simple. Our whole history seems to confirm this
premise. From Euclid to Copernicus, from Galileo to Newton
to Maxwell and Hertz to Einstein to Heisenberg and
Schoedinger and Bohr, from Darwin to Pauling, this is our
central premise. The problem of the organization of the
brain, our central and self-referential problem, is then
either the exception to this rule, (paradoxically it is
also the center of all the other organization), or it will
itself be organized on such a principle. But is the
Copernican center of that organization to be found in the
fundamental principles -and organization- of biology and
chemistry, or in principles unique to the brain itself? In
short, is a "Newtonian physics" of the brain possible? If
it is, then the problem of "mind", and mind-brain becomes
crucial as it supplies crucial clues to that organization.
There is another facet to the general problem presented
here. It is not that no solution has yet been presented to
the mind-brain problem, but rather that the consensus of
scientific opinion is that there is no solution possible
consistent with our ordinary, (i.e. "folk"), understanding
of mind and perception. The consensus is that only actions
and mechanical processes are possible, that "understanding"
and "perception" must necessarily be reduced to the
mechanical vocalizations, (and the precursors of such
vocalizations), of linguistic automatons. I do not claim
that this is not a formally consistent solution, but its
organization is clearly centered in the principles of
biology and physics, and not of the brain itself.
If another solution is presented, it must be judged in
terms of the new possible organizations it enables. To be
significant, it must promise -and specifically suggest- new
and powerful empirical results. Even if it offends basic
dogma, if it also facilitates deep and profound scientific
advance, it must be taken seriously. The solution I will
present here, though highly esoteric, has definite and
specific implications for the directions of empirical
research.
==============================================
CHAPTER I. PROLEGOMENA
VERSION DATE March 20, 1994
"The question whether a science be possible
presupposes a doubt as to its actuality. But such
a doubt offends the men whose whole fortune
consists of this supposed jewel; hence he who
raises the doubt must expect opposition from all
sides. Some, in the proud consciousness of their
possessions, which are ancient and therefore
considered legitimate, will take their metaphysical
compendia in their hands and look down on him with
contempt; others, who never see anything except it
be identical with what they have elsewhere seen
before, will not understand him, and everything
will remain for a time as if nothing had happened
to excite the concern or the hope for an impending
change." (Immanuel Kant, "Prolegomena to any
Future Metaphysics", p.4)
How do you convince a bird, living in a dying tree, to
leave its accustomed perch, its familiar nest, and go to
inhabit another. You may praise the new view, and describe
fantastic horizons invisible to the old. You may catalogue
the abundance of juicy worms and edible insects. But the
bird, clutching stubbornly to its worn branch, may only
envision the loss of its well-defined routines. The path
to an easy patch of straw for its nest or a worm-rich
meadow might become convoluted, or even impossible because
of distance or predators. It cannot even envision the view
from the new place unless it is willing to chance an
exploratory flight. Its world is simple and uncomplicated
-or at least the complications are well known.
This is much my problem here. The mind-body problem is
the most difficult in the history of the human intellect.
It hinges on the problem of cognition -and that is the
problem of everything! Its solution involves a brand new
roost -a new intellectual perspective with horizons
different but incomparably broader than before. It has
sunsets of unmatched vividness, and new and fertile
meadows, but it involves a risk. I invite you to conquer
your fear of alienation and try your wings in an
exploratory flight to a very different tree of knowledge.
There are really just two schools of thought on the
mind-body problem. One holds that the relationship between
the mind and the brain is inherently unsolvable. It holds
that the natures of mind and brain are either absolutely
incommensurate, (are of different kinds), or the problem is
beyond intrinsic limitations on human understanding. The
other school holds that the relationship is perfectly
direct and unproblematic, albeit one-sided and exceedingly
complex. The first offers no practical hope whatsoever for
the disfunctions of the human mind, but the latter
destroys the reason for caring in the first place. It's
solution is that we are all automatons, "zombies"! Mind,
in its ordinary sense, is a fantasy, a "figment" of the
imagination! What, then, does it matter whether another
automaton makes "pain" noises rather than "happy" noises?
Less delicately, what possible objection could there be to
the Dachau "fetus series" or to human vivisection in
Manchuria? The solutions offered by both schools,
moreover, are counterintuitive, limit the scope of
empirical investigation and involve significant
difficulties. I will offer a new alternative capable of
resolving the whole of the problem and commensurate with
the whole of the human spirit.
This book sets forth a novel and revolutionary theory of
cognition. It also outlines the far-reaching, (but
unsettling), consequences it entails. I will propose three
radical and synergistic theses. Individually they are
outrageous; together they make plausible sense of our
profoundest dilemma: the Mind-Body problem.
Given this prospectus, I feel a more detailed overview
of the whole proposal, (than is normal in an introduction),
is warranted here. I feel I must reveal the plot in order
to get my actors on the stage! Like the playwright
therefore, I humbly request a temporary suspension of
disbelief. I ask you to at least hear the plot before
laughing at the peculiar costumes!
(1) WHY? My first thesis is biological. I will propose
that evolution's progressive coordination of the reactive
neural ensembles of primitive organisms actually created
their "objects". But it created those objects -even their
"perceptual objects"- solely as nexuses, (i.e.
intersections and coordinators), of disparate and
distributed response rather than as explicit referents to
environment! I propose that they were, therefore,
efficacious coordinative entities -virtual and schematic
only! I will propose, as an evolutionary consequence,
that the human brain's objects are virtual as well! They
are evolutionary optimizations -and artifacts- solely for
the coordination of internal process. I propose that the
brain's objects, then, are schematic only! Even our
ordinary objects of perception are schematic artifacts of
process. They are in no simple correlation with objective
reality!
This conception, though startling, (and at first even
bizarre), absolutely simplifies the problem of the
"percept" however. Its origin and function become totally
transparent and unenigmatic. It becomes a clear and
foreseeable consequence of ordinary, (rather than
extraordinary), evolutionary process -the cumulative (and
linear) result of simple organizing and optimizing
refinements to structure! I will argue for the legitimacy
of this incredible conception on the basis of necessary
design constraints for the instrumentation and control of
extremely complex and critical processes. But brain
function surely fits that bill! It is incredibly complex
and its mission is to avoid the moment by moment, (and
longer term), disaster which is our biological reality. I
will argue that the primary design consideration for the
control of such a system is efficacy of response, not
literal realism, and that this need is met better with a
virtual and schematic, (i.e. operative), "object" than with
a realistic, representative one.
The justification is very simple: a virtual object can
distribute, (and complicate), reference to achieve
operative and computational simplicity! Indeed, this is
our ordinary use for virtual systems -the computer screen
in front of me is an immediate example. In my simplistic
manipulation of the schematic objects of its GUI, I am, in
fact, effecting and coordinating quite diverse and
disparate operations at the physical level of the computer.
This calculational simplicity and efficiency, enabled by
the schematic object for dealing with a complex
environment, constitutes a clear and powerful evolutionary
rationale. It is especially compelling at the scale of the
human organism, i.e. the trillion or so cells which
comprise the human cooperative enterprise, where the
organizational and computational problem is clearly
preeminent. I will argue that evolution chose this course
rather than the literal representation of its objective
world. "Representation" would necessitate the
incorporation of the innate complexity of the world it
represented into the very computations -and the "calculus"-
dealing with it. It is not only a teleologically
difficult, but a biologically inefficient hypothesis as
well. Very roughly put, I propose that the human
"operating system" is, (embodies), a virtual MacIntosh
"GUI", (graphic user interface), rather than a literal DOS
command line interface! Indeed I will argue that literal
representation is evolutionarily impossible. It is the
"parallel postulate" of evolution!
Significantly, from the designer's standpoint, it is not
important that the "operator" of such a (complicated)
process knows what it is, (specifically), that he is doing,
only that he does it well! It is important that he does it
diligently, however! It is important that he be locked
into the loop of his virtual reality -that he pay
attention. This introduces the necessity of an inbuilt
realistic imperative -i.e. a mechanical guarantee of his
dedication. The universal and dogmatic belief in the
(simple) reality of our natural world is thus itself a
consequence of my thesis -and the greatest obstacle to its
acceptance.
This (first) thesis supplies an immediate and
naturalistic biological rationale for "mind". "Mind",
(the "objects" and their computational relationality),
becomes a natural and, for the first time, (in contrast
with the Naturalists' story), a linear rather than an
incidental consequence of evolution. It is the
consummation of evolution's incremental extension and
organizational optimization of primitive (reactive) neural
arrays. But, given my thesis however, its "objects" now
clearly function as metaphors of process, and not as
informational units of environment! The "large database"
and the related problems of "information" encountered in
the field of artificial intelligence, for instance, are
thus not problems for the human brain at this level -save
internal to the metaphor itself. This thesis greatly
simplifies other crucial aspects of the mind-body problem
as well, and, contrary to all current paradigms, suggests
the beginnings of a definite "galilean mechanics"
appropriate to neuroscience. The "objects" of our
perceptual world are no longer metaphysical "givens", but,
rather, are operationally continuous with, and open to
explicit and precise resolution in terms of, the overall
(operative) brain function of which they form a part. I
propose, then, brain as an operational continuum!
This continuum opens the further and distinct
possibility of an actual "physics", i.e. a mathematical and
scientific mechanics of mind and brain, as it defines, for
the first time, an appropriate context in which it could be
formulated. Just as the SUPERB theories of Newton,
Maxwell, and Einstein were literally inconceivable in the
cosmological context of Ptolemy or in the physical (and
gravitational) context of Aristotle, neither can the
SUPERB theories which must eventually encompass the mind
and the brain arise without the context -and the continuum
-which will make them possible.
Contra:
Conversely however, this (first) hypothesis
significantly complicates our conceptions of objective
reality! It violates, (or rather, stretches), almost every
paradigm in our contemporary intellectual universe as well.
But why, given the level of "strangeness" in modern
science, would we expect that our most fundamental problem
of "measurement", that of cognition itself, would fall to a
simple "naturalistic", (i.e. naive realistic), approach in
the first place -or that its solution would have only
minor repercussions? My answer admittedly leaves us in a
dilemma however, because the "events", the relationality
embodied in the naturalistic picture -and in its rendering
of empirical science- are the very subject of our
discussion!
The solution I will propose is that, though we must
preserve the invariant relationality of empirical science
and of common experience, we needn't preserve their
primitives, their "objects", nor even their hierarchical
organization as ontic referents. Returning to the
"Macintosh" analogy utilized earlier, because "the letter
is in the trashcan" does not imply that that aspect of
computer process which is "the letter" is physically or
logically inside that aspect of computer process which is
the "trashcan" -i.e. it does not imply that they are
hierarchically organized! I will suggest a very different
correspondence between mind and externality in my third
thesis. Mathematics and biology suggest other
possibilities besides simple isomorphism.
The very complications of this (first) thesis, moreover,
are commensurate with, they are of the same order and the
same type as the complications already necessitated by the
conceptual dilemmas of modern physics, (and are subject to
the same resolving strategies as well). They force us, (as
do their counterparts in physical science), to look at the
ground and even the meaning of a "theory of reality". They
force us to a revised view of science itself. Science,
(and theories of reality generally), are ultimately, I will
propose, operative rather than descriptive, (i.e.
referential), enterprises. This is hardly a new
suggestion, but the conclusion of many of the pioneers of
modern physics. In the context of the "schematic object",
however, it takes on a new clarity and force. Science,
(with its "objects"), is thus an immediate corollary of my
theorem for our perceptual world! It is just our ultimate,
(and, ultimately, schematic), scheme for coordinating
reactive process! It is our species' ultimate strategy,
(and ultimate metaphor), of biological response.
(2) HOW? My second thesis, (complementary to the
first), is a logical one. It proposes a profound change in
our thinking, and, at the very basis of that thinking, a
new formal concept: the "concept of implicit definition".
Based on ideas of the philosopher Ernst Cassirer and the
mathematician David Hilbert, it is a plausible and
culminating extension of our current (aristotelian) formal
concept. It provides the grounds for the resolution of the
most fundamental dilemma of the mind-body problem, and
supplies a believable explication of "consciousness"
itself. It also suggests the form of the empiric calculus
which will ultimately integrate the brain and the mind.
Cassirer:
Citing the earlier ideas of Lambert, Cassirer noted
that, contrary to the machinations of classical logic:
"When a mathematician makes his formula more
general, this means not only that he is to retain
all the more special cases but also be able to
deduce them from the universal formula. The [this]
possibility of deduction is not found in the case
of the scholastic concepts, since these, according
to the traditional formula, are formed by
neglecting the particular, and hence the
reproduction of the particular moments of the
concept seems excluded. ... The ideal of a
scientific concept here appears in opposition to
the schematic general presentation which is
expressed by a mere word. The genuine concept does
not disregard the peculiarities and particularities
which it holds under it, but seeks to show the
necessity of the occurrence and connection of just
these particularities. What it gives is a
universal rule for the connection of the
particulars themselves." (Cassirer, 1923, P. 19,
his emphasis)
This insight characterizes a profoundly more potent and
significant formal concept which is implicit not only in
mathematics, but also in the whole of the modern physical
sciences.
"In opposition to the logic of the generic concept
... there now appears the logic of the mathematical
concept of function. However, the field of
application of this form of logic is not confined
to mathematics alone. On the contrary, ... [it]
constitutes the general schema and model according
to which the modern concept of nature has been
molded in its progressive historical development."
(ibid ,P.21)
Cassirer maintained that the concept of mathematics and
science, (and even our concept of normal usage), is not, in
fact, formed by the hierarchical abstraction postulated by
Aristotle except as a limiting case!
Clearly the concept of "metal", for instance, is not
formed by abstracting only the common properties, the
common "marks" of its instances. It is not formed by
neglecting the specific color of gold, the conductivity of
copper, or the density of lead, but rather by replacing
each "lost" property with a functional relation, (i.e. a
rule), whose values, in sum, "perfectly represent" the
extension of the concept! Thus "metal" necessarily
incorporates some color, some conductivity, and some
density connected in a functional relationality.
"Animal", likewise, involves some form of procreation, of
respiration, etc. even though none is common to all
animals.
He argued, in consequence, that the formal concept is an
assemblage of functional rules, logically and cognitively
independent and distinct from its application. The
similarity of certain elements, (under the classical view),
can only be meaningful when a certain point of view has
already been established. It is not a product of
abstraction!
"That which binds the elements of the series a,b,c
... together is not itself a new element, that was
factually blended with them, but it is the rule of
progression, which remains the same, no matter in
which member it is represented. The function
F(a,b), F(b,c), ... which determines the sort of
dependence between the successive members, is
obviously not to be pointed out as itself a member
of the series, which exists and develops according
to it. (ibid, p.17)
It is, rather, an ordering!
"This identity of reference, of point of view,
under which the comparison takes place, is,
however, something distinctive and new as regards
the compared contents themselves. The difference
between these contents, on the one hand, and the
conceptual 'species,' on the other, by which we
unify them, is an irreducible fact; it is
categorical and belongs to the 'form of
consciousness.' ... The content of the concept
cannot be dissolved into the elements of its
extension, because the two do not lie on the same
plane but belong in principle to different
dimensions. The meaning of the law that connects
the individual members is not to be exhausted by
the enumeration of any number of instances of the
law; for such enumeration lacks the generating
principle that enables us to connect the individual
members into a functional whole." (ibid, pp. 25-26)
Cassirer proposed the "functional concept of
mathematics": F(x,y,z...), (a function of functions), as
the appropriate definition, (and actual origin), of the
formal concept.
It is a (complex) rule of progression independent and
distinct from its extension -"a new expression of the
characteristic distinction between the form of a series and
the elements of the series." He argued that it is distinct
from perception as well -it is a "new form of
consciousness". I will argue that it is the only form of
consciousness.
Hilbert:
David Hilbert was, plausibly, one of the most
influential mathematicians of all time. His brilliant
insight of the "implicit definition" of mathematical axiom
systems has become foundational for the whole of modern
mathematics. He saw that those systems, insofar as they
are mathematical, do not deal with extrinsic things. They
deal only with the "things" which they themselves define
internally. Their elements and the relations between these
elements, (their internal relationality, e.g. "+", "X",
"<"), are logically, (i.e. implicitly), defined by, (and
have mathematical "existence" solely as such within), an
axiom system as a whole. Schlick describes Hilbert's
"copernican revolution" in these words:
"These terms" [the elements and the internal
relationality] "... acquire meaning only by virtue
of the axiom system, and possess only the content
that it bestows upon them. They stand for entities
whose whole being is to be bearers of the relations
laid down by the system.", (my emphasis).
Hilbert's inspiration was simple and elegant, but it
literally sundered the logical heavens! It provides the
genesis for the natural extension of Cassirer's "functional
concept of mathematics" into a still larger framework and
an ultimate formal concept: the "concept of implicit
definition" which I will develope in Chapter 5. Defined in
analogy to a mathematical axiom system, I will argue that
this is the ultimate logical rule, and the ultimate
"ordering"! It captures the logical functionality of a
system, (of axioms), which, significantly, (implicitly)
generates its very extension, (its abstract "domain"),
solely as an embodiment of its own (logical) "ordering" -
its rule. An axiom system is a form of a "series" which
wholely specifies its "elements" -by definition! Its
elements are virtual elements expressing its innate order.
The whole of their meaning and the whole of their being is
solely as such!
If we take the percept as such an element for the brain,
(the first thesis), then the "concept of implicit
definition" opens a new possibility for "mind" and
"consciousness". It removes the fundamental antithesis
between "subject" and "object", (or "perceiver" and
"perceived"), which is the core of the problem. "The
subject" is now the system of implicit definition in which,
(rather than to which), "the object", (to include the
schematic percept), is defined! That "object", moreover,
is universally known as it is only universally that it
exists! But that "object" refers to its, (the system's),
own operationality and not to an external object. The
objects of the system don't refer to objective reality, to
externality, its "axioms" do!
In a somewhat different context Patricia Churchland made
an observation quite relevant to this perspective:
"It emerged that the meaning", (my emphasis), "of
the most respectable of theoretical terms was
defined implicitly by the theory the terms figured
in, not by the empirical consequences of the
theory. Terms such as 'force field', 'energy', and
'electromagnetic radiation' were prime examples
where meaning was a function of the embedding
theory and where operational definitions were
laughable."
"Whole theories have empirical consequences, and it
is whole theories that are the basic units of
meaning", (my emphasis), " -not terms, not
sentences, and not subparts of the network. To be
acceptable as an account of nature, a theoretical
network must, as a whole, touch an observational
base, but not every acceptable sentence or term in
the network must do so." (P.S. Churchland, 1986,
pps. 265-266)
Though this is stated as an argument against
operationalism, it is, in fact, a very powerful argument
for a higher meaning of operationalism. Whole theories,
whole systems are operative. They are the basic units of
meaning and the basic units of reference -i.e. have
"empirical consequences"! Cassirer, in close parallelism,
argued that these systems are implicitly defined from
their "generating relations" -i.e., the fundamental laws
and principles of science. These systems, then, are "axiom
systems"!
I am proposing that the human mind itself is a
theoretical (and operative) network, and it is only as a
whole that it touches its base -i.e. its environment. As a
whole it determines the meaning of its terms and implicitly
defines its "objects".
(I will suggest a possible physical paradigm, (i.e. of
brain function), which could instantiate this perspective.
I will suggest that the gross physical and/or operative
subdivisions of the physical brain might be these very
"axioms" of response!)
Ultimately this conception resolves the profoundest
dilemma of mind: the "mind's 'eye'"! "The mind's 'eye'",
(What is it that sees what I see?), otherwise cast as the
"Cartesian Theatre", is a problem that Naturalists want to
reduce to absurdity. They argue, for example, that it is
regressive and logically vacuous thereby. This forces
them to wholly replace the "unity" and the coherence of a
mental "stuff" or "place" with, as Dennett for instance
forthrightly declares, spatially and temporally
distributed, discrete physical processes! It spells the
death of "mind" and "consciousness" as we know it. Nowhere
can "mind" or "consciousness" exist as unified or cohesive
entities therefore, (under their thesis), save in
linguistic behavior and its discrete and mechanical
substrate -or in our intellectual (and linguistic)
synthesis of them. Thus "self", for Dennett, is the
"center of narrative gravity" of linguistic behavior, -it
is the semantic analytical solution of all the writings and
speakings of a linguistic automaton! "Multiple Drafts" are
the results of differing (linguistic) "probes" on
variegated underlying processes which contravene a unified
"theatre".
The peculiar intransigence of this problem and the
frankly counterintuitive character of the Naturalist answer
to it suggests that the problem is substantive and not
illusory however. The "concept of implicit definition",
(together with the "schematic object"), actually resolves
this dilemma and provides a plausible working model! It
provides for the "how" of a unified "film" and theatre. It
provides for the "what", (the "meaning" and the "being"),
of the "qualia" and the "figment" of mind. The "eye",
(the subject), is the theatre -with its running "film"-
itself! Consciousness is this system of implicit
definition!
There are levels of implicit definition in axiom
systems, however. The "object" of group theory, for
instance, is less "focused", less precise than is the
"object" of a field. Even within a given axiom system,
moreover, the "objects" a1, a2, a3..., and the internal
relationality, the "+" and "x" of an integral domain, for
instance, exist on a different level of (internal) logical
"focus" than does the progressive interaction of the axioms
which generates them. This is the distinction I propose
between "conscious" and "unconscious" mind. That which is
"conscious" is defined at a higher level of precision than
is that which is "unconscious"!
Dennett's highly cogent critique of "folk psychology",
(and "mind") -the spatial and temporal "smearing" of the
percept and the non-explicit reference of qualia, for
instance, -forces a profound extension to the traditional
"theatre", however. But his dimensional extension actually
fits very well with the model I am proposing. I submit
that it is more plausible in terms of the "focus" and
"function" of an operational "object" than in terms of his
"multiple drafts" "demons" and "memes". His objections to
the ordinary "Cartesian theatre" are admittedly valid
however, but so were those of Cassirer and Helmholtz before
him:
"For example, if we conceive the different
perceptual images, which we receive from one and
the same 'object' according to our distance from it
and according to changing illumination, as
comprehended in a series of perceptual images, then
from the standpoint of immediate psychological
experience, no property can be indicated at first
by which any of these varying images should have
preeminence over any other. Only the totality of
these data of perception constitutes what we call
empirical knowledge of the object; and in this
totality no single element is absolutely
superfluous. No one of the successive perspective
aspects can claim to be the only valid, absolute
expression of the 'object itself;' rather all the
cognitive value of any particular perception
belongs to it only in connection with other
contents, with which it combines into an empirical
whole.
...In this sense, the presentation of the
stereometric form plays 'the role of a concept'",
(my emphasis), "'compounded from a great series of
sense perceptions, which, however, could not
necessarily be construed in verbally expressible
definitions, such as the geometrician uses, but
only through the living presentation of the law,
according to which the perspective images follow
each other.' This ordering by a concept means,
however, that the various elements do not lie
alongside of each other like the parts of an
aggregate, but that we estimate each of them
according to its systematic significance...."
(Cassirer, 1923, pp. 288-289, quoting Helmholtz)
The significance of this passage depends on an
appreciation of Cassirer's prior redefinition of the formal
concept. The concept, for Cassirer, is a function, "the
form of a series", independent and distinct from what it
orders. This is the "systematic significance" which he
purports. The stereometric form, the percept, then plays
the role of, (is), a function!
If we take the mind to be schematic, i.e. a predictive
and intentional operational model, rather than a
representative one, then the temporal and spatial
"smearing" of the percept do not have the implications
against the "theatre" per se that Dennett attributes to
them. I propose that the percept is conceptual, (albeit a
specialized, invariant concept), and therefore, following
Cassirer, functional. It is an entity of order and
process -and it is "smeared". That is the nature of
functions -functions are smeared! What Dennett explains by
"multiple drafts", (and the "demonic" process it
necessitates beneath them), however, I explain by "focus".
We focus the percept, (via implicit definition) according
to operational need!
My (second) thesis furnishes a coherent biological
explication for "mind" and "consciousness". If even the
"percept" is just a special (and natural) aspect of the
(extended) "concept", then mind is clearly a logical
continuum, complementary to the operational continuum
proposed under the first thesis! This concordance suggests
an identity: our "objects" are logical as well as
operational objects. But note that the ultimate
biological rationale for human logic is necessarily
evolutionary, -i.e. determined by natural selection!
Logic must then necessarily be a rule of correspondence, (a
procedural rule), between the brain and its environment.
The (primitive) rule of logic itself is therefore
operational, (rather than transcendental). The first two
theses are equivalent: the "mind" is the (logical -i.e.
logically operational) "concept" of the brain!
The unity of consciousness, the unity of mind is a
logical, a conceptual and operational, rather than a
spatial unity. The paradoxes of the Cartesian Theatre do
not derive from an innate flaw -or phantasy- of "mind";
they derive from a deficiency of ordinary logic!
<*>
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Re: ASCII POSTING "A NEW AND
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Virtual Reality: Consciousness Really Explained!
(Why, How, Where and What: A Radical Proposal)
(copyright April, 1994)
by
Jerome Iglowitz
======================================================
PART TWO OF THREE. Chapter 1, part 2, (split for
transmission). CONVERTED TO ASCII, ALL FORMATTING AND
FOOTNOTES LOST! (WORDPERFECT 4.1 ON AN AMIGA)
=====================================================
CHAPTER 1, PART 2
(3) WHERE and WHAT? I will expound my third and final
thesis in Chapter ***, "The Problem of Realism". This will
be, in terms of emotional acceptability, the most difficult
of my theses. I will argue for an ontic picture based
firmly in realism, but not in Naturalism.
"Naturalism" is the belief not only that the ontic
world is real and "material", (however we specify that
word), but also that it is spatially and temporally
organized, (at least on the human scale), in just the same
way that common sense, (i.e. naive realism), says it is!
Naturalists assert that the only possible correlation
between brain process and reality is that of isomorphism.
But this is an unnecessarily restricted conception of
the possible types of correspondence between the
functioning of an organism, (specifically the human
organism), and its environment. It loses sight,
furthermore, of the central insights offered by classical
skepticism and assumes that Kant's problem is solved. A
careful reading of Maturana and Varela's arguments in "The
Tree of Knowledge" suggests a very different correlation
between a biological organism and its (ontic) environment:
"structural coupling". The whole force of science, (and
biology specifically), argues against an organism, being
informed by its environment -or, in disagreement with even
Maturana and Varela, against its incorporating that
environment isomorphically even as process!. The
organism's relationality to its environment is one of
appropriateness rather than one of embodiment or
parallelism. This implies a principle of causal
indeterminism rather than one of specificity. Evolution is
a purely operative principle! It deals, pure and simply,
with successful functionality! That incremental
refinements to operationality should somehow capture the
essence of, (isomorphically embody), the relationality of
the environment itself rather than the just the short end
of its purely tactical interplay with the organism, (that
it should capture the cause rather than the effect), can be
explained in only one way: "and then a miracle occurs"!
How much simpler is the hypothesis that those incremental
refinements to operationality should capture their own
essence!
Maturana and Varela argue specifically against a
representative model. But their arguments, read carefully,
suggest something far deeper. They suggest that, contrary
to even the more sophisticated Naturalist positions, (to
include their own), there can be no isomorphic
instantiation of the relationality of externality in an
organism even as process!
Naturalism loses sight of the inherent closure of our
cognitive process. Classical skepticism made this clearly
evident, and it was fully acknowledged by the founders of
empiricism. Contemporary Naturalism attempts to circumvent
this closure by a translation of the problem -and "the
mind"- to language and the underlying linguistic processes
of the brain. Maturana and Varela, for instance, are quite
explicit. They translate "mind" as an entity of
"linguistic coupling", i.e., linguistic behavior.
"At the same time, as a phenomenon of languaging in
the network of social and linguistic coupling, the
mind is not something that is within my brain.
Consciousness and mind belong to the realm of
social", (i.e. linguistic), coupling...
But they at least acknowledge the closure of the
process:
"Language was never invented by anyone only to take
in an outside world. Therefore, it cannot be used
as a tool to reveal that world. Rather, it is by
languaging that the act of knowing, in the
behavioral coordination which is language, brings
forth a world."
Dennett, similarly, translates "mind", (and cognitive
process), as entities of language: "memes", (cultural "data
packets"), and the (distributed) brain process in which
they function. But the arguments of skepticism apply to
language, (and its neural substrate), as well as to
perception. Language is no less closed, no less mediated
than is perception itself! It is a behavioral phenomenon,
the result of genetic and cultural evolutionary, (i.e.
fortuitous), process! It is not epistemic!
I will devote a chapter to Dennett's answer to the mind-
body problem. It is clear, absolutely forthright, and
closely reasoned. His objections to the ordinary
conception of mind, (and the ordinary "theatre"), as
already mentioned, are legitimate and necessitate a
profound and dimensional extension to the ordinary
("folk") conception of "mind". His ultimate answer is, I
will argue however, wrong.
"As Akins observes, it is not the point of our
sensory systems that they should detect 'basic' or
'natural' properties of the environment, but just
that they should serve our 'narcissistic' purposes
in staying alive; nature doesn't build epistemic
engines." (Dennett, 1991, P.382, my emphasis)
And yet he assumes, as do all Naturalists, that the
fruits of the human "engine", i.e. language and its
embodied naturalistic picture, is epistemic! He assumes
that it, and its "Naturalism" describes, (i.e. is
isomorphic to), reality. My answer, (stated in terms of
"structural coupling"), will involve only that
"narcissism" itself -i.e. the "staying alive"! Our
relationship to reality is one of appropriateness, (of
causal indeterminism); not one of capture! It is not
epistemic.
Maturana and Varela emphacize a trivial but profoundly
pertinent point early on in their book: "Everything said is
said by someone." There is an important and deeper
corollary: any discussion will always take place inside of
a model, i.e. a context. For the mind-body problem that
model may be "mental", "behavioral", "linguistic" or some
new alternative, but there will always be some model. We
are locked inside a "magic circle", to use Cassirer's term.
So when we demand a correlation between objective reality
and the brain, what we want is a correlation between "the
brain", as an entity within our model, and the "objects"
and their system of law as further entities of that same
model! In this context however, "isomorphism" is a
legitimate demand -founded on needs of internal consistency
of the model. There must, therefore, be some isomorphism,
(i.e. an automorphism), between the brain and the rest of
our (internal) model. "Isomorphism", however, is a broader
concept than Naturalists' use of it!
Technically, two domains are "isomorphic" to each other
if a one-to-one correspondence can be specified between
them which preserves some (possibly different) operation or
operations internal to them. But the mathematical concept
is more general than the isomorphism between integral
domains, (e.g. the whole numbers), or between ordered
fields, (e.g. the rational numbers), for example. This
kind of isomorphism supplies the model for the Naturalist
conception, relating "points" to "points", "betweens" to
"betweens" or "things" to "things". It provides the
rationale of hierarchical reduction as well. The
mathematical concept has more profound possibilities,
however, residing in its group-theoretic usage. This
"isomorphism" can relate entirely different contexts!
Consider the isomorphism between J3, the additive group
of integers modulo 3, and the group of rigid rotations of
an equilateral triangle onto itself as a simple example.
This is a correlation between the "objects", ['0', '1',
'2'], and a group of transformations, each mapping an
infinite domain onto itself! It relates, in strict
isomorphism, a domain of "things" to a domain of continuous
mathematical functions! It illustrates a very different
and, I propose, a more appropriate model for the kind of
correspondence between the brain and "objective reality".
Certainly the brain is a transformation when considered
either on the level of behavioral response, (input-output-
input), or on the level of fine-grained neural process. I
suggest that the "objects" of the brain are transformations
coordinating distributed response. These are the "objects
of effective action" named by Maturana and Varela and they
are (group-theoretic) isomorphic to the other, (i.e.
"objective") "objects" of our model! I suggest that it is
only in this sense of "isomorphism" that they map to the
"objective world", (of our model).
Our relationship to ontic reality, (rather than the
internal relationality of the model itself), is another
issue. "Structural coupling" -appropriate relationality-
provides the key. It is a profound heuristic and
operational principle which supercedes its Naturalistic
origin. (I will argue that it actually reduces those
origins, but not itself, to absurdity.) It requires that
the relationship of an organism to its environment is one
of (beneficial) process and not of information. Though
that correlation is certainly opportunistic and necessary,
it is a long "logical leap" from this to being sufficient,
-to capture! It does not, therefore, imply a functional
parallelism, (i.e. an isomorphism), but a causal
indeterminacy. Though this realization enormously
complicates our conceptions of physical reality, I will
show that it resolves the dilemma at which Maturana and
Varela will arrive. Ultimately, I will argue, our sole and
only interface to externality lies in the reverse analysis
of the implicit definition of our axiom-like relationality
of response, i.e. of that which generates our perceptual
and mental world.
The position I will propose vis-a-vis "realism" is that
of "material relativism". I will argue that "material", in
the sense it is usually meant by Materialists, -and
especially Naturalists- is to epistemology what the "ether"
is to modern physics. We have absolutely no means of
interaction with it save a purely relational one -as
classical empiricism fully realized. I have already
suggested that this relationship is necessarily more
esoteric than we have heretofore believed.
If a "material" hypothesis must be made, (and realistic
considerations suggest that it must), then the "material" I
will suggest as ontic is our interface itself! It is the
only "material" we can posit as ontic! It is our only
necessary and only defensible ontic commitment. But this
interface, this structural coupling is relational in the
purest and rawest sense of the word. What it is relational
between, or if it is such, we will never know!
"Matter is substantia phaenomenon. Whatever is
intrinsic to it I seek in all parts of the space
that it occupies and in all effects that it exerts,
which, after all, can never be anything but
phenomena of the outer sense. Thus I have nothing
absolute but merely something comparatively
internal which, in its turn consists only of
external relationships. But what appears to the
mere understanding as the absolute essence of
matter is again simply a fancy, for matter is never
an object of pure understanding; but the
transcendental object that may be the ground of
this appearance called matter is a bare Something,
whose nature we should never be able to understand
even though someone could tell us about it. ... The
observation and analysis of phenomena press toward
a knowledge of the secrets of nature and there is
no knowing how far they may penetrate in time. But
for all that we shall never succeed in answering
those transcendental questions that reach out
beyond nature, though all nature were to be
revealed to our gaze."
It is the relationality of "structural coupling", of
process itself that I will propose as ontic. This is not
the "relation" between "objects", (an axiomatically
"internal" and implicitly defined relationality), but an
axiom-like "material"! The first two theses explicate and
validate this proposal and provide a new perspective on the
problem. This thesis does not invalidate a realistic
"material", however, no more than did Einstein's
relativity, (nor the principle of indeterminacy), destroy
"space", "time", or "mass"! It is a "realistic" hypothesis
in that it does, indeed, posit an ontic and actual
"material" and an "observer-independent model of reality".
But the "material" it posits is not anthropomorphic. It is
not "tactile", "spatial", "localized" or "dense". Reality,
(insofar as we can ever know it), is not "object(ive)"!
The basic unit of cognition is the "axiom system". The
basic unit of ontology is the "axiom"!
In chapter *** (The Problem of Philosophy), I will
address the problem of "experience" and show that it leads
to an epistemological relativism. "Experience" will be
defined as that which remains invariant under all
comprehensive, consistent and useful theories of reality.
Is this solopsism then, Maturana and Varela's "absolute
cognitive solitude"? A better characterization of it
might be "relativism". And a still better one might be
(causal) "indeterminism"! These are the physical sciences'
final answer. Is it so strange that they should be the
final answer of philosophy as well?
My answer is thus not Berkeley's, but Kant's, -but given
the broadening of apodictic necessity required by the
example of the schematic object, and given also the
blurring of the lines between analytic and synthetic
judgements furnished by the history of modern science! The
latter leads to the enlargement of the logical problem
itself and results in the concept of implicit definition.
It is thus not "the mind of god" that we end up with, but
rather with "experience" in its broadest sense and with
epistemology itself, -with the forms of knowing, and with
the causal, (i.e. metaphysical), indeterminism that
implies. But "extension and figure", Kant's essential
elements of pure "intuition" are no longer apodictic. In
this Berkeley was absolutely correct. My answer therefore,
resolves these two profound insights.
"Sensuous impressions", (contrary to Kant and almost
everyone else), were never givens, but are, rather,
biological constructs -i.e. conclusions of a biological
theory of mind-brain! What we are given, ultimately, is
experience, or rather the relationality of experience. But
the apodictic component of that relationality of experience
is that which remains invariant under all consistent and
productive interpretations of reality!
This hypothesis is hard, and the problem it deals with
is the hardest one that there is. It deals with what it is
that is real, i.e., what does "real" mean? It also
contravenes what I believe is a strong and inbuilt
imperative in the structure of our human minds. Difficult
though it is, however, my (third) thesis provides the
requisite "substance" of minds, and the "substance" of
ontic reality. A system of axiom-like relationality as I
will propose, taken as ontic, is quickened -it becomes
"live" and "conscious" in all the ways we could possibly
demand of "mind"! The thesis is consistent and
"congenial", moreover, with the fundamentals of modern
physical science. The "strangeness" of modern science is
not a strangeness of relation; it is a strangeness of
material, (i.e. objective), ontic reference! Taken as an
operational and relational system, however, its modern
developments are no longer mysterious or paradoxical but
belong to the legitimate wonders of mathematics.
As an unexpected dividend, this thesis also turns out to
rescue "naive realism" from disrepute. It becomes a
legitimate and alternative, a real copernican perspective
on the relationality of scientific realism. If what is
real -what is ontic- is relation, then there are
legitimate, (real), alternative perspectives on that
relationality, and naive realism, (our inbuilt model), is
one of them. Our naive world is real after all! This is
the west gate of Eden -the unguarded rear entrance
prophesied by Kleist.
"For man, once driven from the paradise of
immediacy -man who has once partaken of the tree of
knowledge and therewith has forever left behind the
limits of merely natural existence, of life which
is unconscious of itself -for man it follows that
he must traverse his appointed orbit, in order at
the end of his road to find his way back again to
its beginning. That is the fate imposed by our
'circular world.' 'Paradise is bolted fast, and
the cherub far behind us; we must travel around the
world and see whether perchance an entrance can be
found somewhere from the rear.'" Cassirer 1949,
P.858. (His quote is from Kleist's "On the
Marionette Theatre")
My argument is not against the reality of an ontic
world, for I am at least as much a realist as any of you.
But it is against its simplicity -and against the
simplicity of our relationship to it. The whole history of
modern physics makes the same argument.
But why, given a "realistic imperative", do we tolerate
the conceptual outrages of modern physics then? We
tolerate them because they (efficiently) produce useful
artifacts and provide a viable predictive scheme. But we
accept them within our naive world only because we feel
they can be hierarchically encapsulated within that world
in terms of scale, i.e. reductively. But this is by no
means an accomplished fact. The path from the exotic
world of quantum mechanics to the (necessarily) non-exotic
naive world we inhabit is not a hierarchical and linear
progression, but a leap of faith. According to many
quantum theorists, there is no objective picture of reality
possible to quantum theory!
"Many physicists, taking their lead from the
central figure of Niels Bohr, would say that there
is no objective picture at all. Nothing is
actually 'out there', at the quantum level.
Somehow, reality emerges only in relation to the
results of 'measurements'. Quantum theory,
according to this view, provides merely a
calculational procedure, and does not attempt to
describe the world as it actually 'is'. This
attitude to the theory seems to me to be too
defeatist, and I shall follow the more positive
line which attributes objective physical reality
to the quantum description: the quantum state."
(Penrose, 1989, P.226)
Naturalists believe existence must consist in a simple,
homogeneous ground. I do not believe that, nor is it
compatible with the empirical results of modern physics.
I believe that our conception of reality in those terms -
that world - is an artifact, and a necessary consequence of
computational simplification!
My theses, in their sum, provide the foundations for a
comprehensive model of mind and an actual solution to the
mind-body problem compatible with the foundations of the
physical sciences. "Mind", "qualia", "figment", and the
"cartesian theatre" stand as a viable entities, but they
stand in a realistic and scientific context. The twin-slit
experiment of quantum physics, (or Michaelson-Morley's of
relativistic physics) is at least as significant to our
conceptions of reality and "mind" as is the "color-phi" and
"blindside"! The relationality of common experience and
empirical science stands validated under my hypotheses, but
their "objects", as objects, are no longer ontic primitives
- they are theoretically reduced under the new theory.
The choice between theories is not solely logical; Quine
made this point very clearly. Any (self-consistent) theory
can be made to account for, (or discount the significance
of), any event. It is the tortuousness of the paths it
must take to what we judge as centrally significant, seen
in light of its overall configuration, that is decisive.
What we seek in a new theory are radical simplifications in
areas we consider critical and a minimal resulting
convolution in other accepted theory. It is a balance,
depending on perspective. But it can involve an actual
revolution in thought -a "copernican revolution"
reorienting the whole of our intellectual world. This
becomes plausible when the "epicycles" of science and
philosophy become too convoluted, too tortuous and demand
radical simplification. This, I maintain, is where we
stand now. Modern physics has invalidated ontic material
reference and philosophy, (specifically the philosophy of
mind), has been forced to reduce its own utterances to
linguistic automatonism. Nowhere is there a fertile
context to enable a Newtonian mechanics for our greatest
science: the science of the mind and the brain.
A theory of cognition is, by nature, a theory of
everything. Cassirer observed that "every transformation
of the genuinely 'formal' concept produces a new
interpretation of the whole field that is characterized and
ordered by it." But cognition, by definition,
characterizes and orders everything! The mind-body
problem, its necessary correlate, is deep and difficult -it
is the hardest problem that exists. It is also the most
important problem in the history of our (human) race.
Subsuming both science and ethics, it will ultimately
determine our future as a civilization. Though this sounds
overly dramatic and even pompous, reflection shows that it
is not. Answers to what we are, and why we are will
determine what we can do and what we will do!
The recent history of Communism on the one hand, or of
any given economic theory -as a very different example- on
the other, are very clear examples. Profound belief
determines actual practice! The bounds of our civilization
will be set by our ultimate understanding of our own being.
This problem demands, therefore, the greatest latitude and
the greatest (conditional) tolerance to radical ideas. It
is too important to be treated otherwise.
It has been said of scientists, (and it certainly
applies to philosophers of mind as well), that they live,
alternately, in two disjoint worlds. They do not take
their reality home with them. The reality they believe as
professionals is not the reality they believe when they
dodge cars on the freeway or make love. None will put out
a saucer of milk for Schroedinger's cat.
Is Dennett, (sitting in his rocker and listening to
Vivaldi), prepared, during his self-stimulating monologue,
to accept himself solely as a "center of narrative
gravity", solely as the cumulative product of separate and
discrete process, without "figment" or "qualia"? I am
perhaps willing to accept him as such, but I am not willing
to accept me as such.
"Brain" is real certainly, the world of physics is real,
but so is "mind" -it is where we start from! What is
needed is a theory that accounts for all of these
realities. But it should do more than just "account" for
them, it should simplify and validate their relationship.
This is what my proposal does. I am calling, therefore,
for a new revolution, the greatest revolution, a
copernican revolution in our total perspective on reality!
My "story", like its fellows, will not compete on the
basis of the arguments that I will present. These serve
primarily to embed it in the context of current thinking.
Rather, it will compete on the basis of the further theory
it will or will not engender and simplify. It will stand
or fall on experimental confirmation or disconfirmation -
and, ultimately, on the basis of the technological
artifacts it generates. The ultimate criterion will be
productivity! I believe that my theory will unlock
fertile scientific "meadows" with degrees of freedom
unimaginable to Naturalism.
Under my theory and the operational continuum it
embodies, our normal world, (our objects and our reality),
is like the leaves floating on the surface of a pond. Or,
better, it is like the bottom of a pond where you see the
swirls and the currents of the water as virtual objects.
But this pond is integrated in depth! There is a richness
and a reality to it that we only scratch the surface, (or
rather the "bottom"), of. There is more to mind than our
(its) objective model. This is the domain in which I
believe even esthetics, art, ethics, and, significantly,
even religion will be ultimately incorporated as
legitimate dimensions of science! I do not think that
these are just, only, small parts of our objective reality,
idiosyncracies of the human brain and vagaries of our
cultural history. I think they are essentials of the human
brain, of the human mind, and, by definition, of the human
soul. They are legitimate and co-equal operative parts of
our model. They are, therefore, legitimate parts of our
reality.
In its parts, this is an outrageous, and even an
offensive proposal. In its whole, it rescues the whole of
our humanity and opens new possibilities for the human
spirit. This book represents the foundation, not the
cathedral I foresee.
Be forewarned that my argument will wend its way over
dangerous paths. It will come perilously close to
behaviorism, Berkelian idealism, and solopsism, but it will
end up securely within the boundaries of pragmatic science
and realism. I seek real and useful answers -not novelty-
and I am deadly serious. These are important answers for
all of us. All the king's horses and all the king's men
have not put our mentally ill together again. Nor have
they solved, but rather intensified, the ultimate futility
of the common man.
The primary object of my arguments throughout this book
will be the Naturalists. This is because I feel they
represent the best of current thinking on the subject.
They seek real and productive, (rather than verbose or
self-defeating), solutions to these problems. These are
solutions important to science, medicine, and ultimate
human values. For this and for their rigorous methodology
I have nothing but the profoundest respect for them. These
solutions must be found! But Naturalists' presumptions and
imaginations are faulty. Their "naturalist world" is as
much the product of an emotional demand, (and a
metaphysical dogmatism), as is the "mentalism" they reject.
Their scientific paradigm is antiquated and their
mathematical imagination is blinded by their
presuppositions.
Like Dennett, I have been wrestling with this problem
for over 35 years. Unlike him, however, until very
recently I have been working in solitude, cut off from the
input of my fellows. I had little expectation, (foolishly
so), of its possible relevancy.
I came to this problem not from philosophical curiosity
or "epistemic hunger", but as a result of personal tragedy
-the loss of a loved one to the maw of mental illness.
Frustration at the inability of science to help her and a
survey of the dismal "mythological", (Freudian and quasi-
Freudian), state of then-current thinking on the subject
caused me to begin a personal and private search,
necessarily based in logical and artistic criteria -but
aimed at an empiric goal. Emerging from my "cave", just a
few years ago, I was blinded by the illuminating and
brilliant bonfires which had been lit on the plains of
biology and philosophy. Since then, with more than a
little trepidation, I have been scouting each of the major
encampments so lit, fearing (selfishly) that my results had
been anticipated. I have concluded that I have something
still new and novel to say. I do not claim the breadth of
knowledge nor the intellectual power of the chieftains of
these camps, but I think that my torch, crafted by art, not
science, carries a unique promethean flame!
I am an amateur, but not a "gentlemanly amateur", if you
please! I trade my body's tissue, bone and muscle, for
each day's bread and lodging for the night. Then, each
night, in the darkest hours by the light of a flickering
screen, I have continued my fanatical quest for the holy
grail. I think I have found it. I think I have "cracked
the code" of mind-brain. Now I, like Benjamin Franklin,
Rousseau's backwoods philosopher, stand before the
sophisticates of Paris in my bearskin cap.
I have come at this problem, (and reached my
conclusion), from "the other side" -i.e. from the necessity
and the demand for a practical solution to the
psychological problem. But, to express my answer, I have
been forced to try to frame it in the language of my
intended listener. That there are major errors in my
conception is a certainty, but the basic thesis, I
maintain, is correct. It is the only one that resolves the
fundamental antinomies, and is at the same time consistent
with empirical science.
That it opens new and fundamental problems, (more even
than it solves), may be raised as a legitimate objection.
But, conversely, that very fact opens new worlds of
possibility for scientific advance and is just as strong an
argument for its plausibility. If, in fact, we have
already "arrived", if you are satisfied that we do, in
fact, possess in rough form the whole of the picture of our
reality, then the very poverty of that reality as regards
the human condition must make you very sad -and kindle the
hope that something more is possible. I think it is! The
belief that this race of apes, able to scribble for a mere
few thousand years, has been able to discover the nature of
its ultimate reality is, in an evolutionary context,
arrogant beyond belief. More plausible is that our organic
community has been able to construct a "hive"!
In conclusion:
I am like a savage, capsized at sea, who has gathered
flotsam, piece by piece, and lashed it together with
seaweed. I have made a sail of a whale bladder and my
rudder is at deadly peril to passing sharks. But it works,
and I have learned things about the sea and about sailing
that I think the captains of the majestic oil tankers, or
the dapper skippers of the jaunty yachts, for all their
instrumentation, were able to ignore or were too far above
the sea to learn! I have been blown onto shores not on
their charts and seen many wondrous things.
Hear my tale and take title to these vistas with my
blessing! I do not have the skills or the strength to
exploit them. If, perchance, you should want to
communicate with me, you must toss me notes in bottles,
written in my simple, primitive language as I have no radio
on board. If you should want to rendezvous, you must give
me time to navigate my primitive craft to our place of
meeting! If you wanted to offer me a tow, I would not be
too proud to accept it!
<*>
Origin: SNET - 0030 - COGNITIVE
From: JERRYI@DELPHI.COM Public
To: ALL
Date: 06/04/94 at 03:26
Re: ASCII POSTING, "A NEW AND
-------------------------------------------------------------------
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Virtual Reality: Consciousness Really Explained!
(Why, How, Where and What: A Radical Proposal)
(copyright April, 1994)
by
Jerome Iglowitz
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PART THREE OF THREE. Chapter 2. CONVERTED TO ASCII, ALL
FORMATTING AND FOOTNOTES LOST! (WORDPERFECT 4.1 ON AN
AMIGA)
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VERSION DATE: April 14, 1994
CHAPTER II. THE BIOLOGICAL PROBLEM: PART ONE
(An alternative to representation)
"The plastic splendor of the nervous system does
not lie in its production of 'engrams' or
representation of things in the world; rather, it
lies in its continuous transformation in line with
transformations of the environment as a result of
how each interaction affects it. From the
observer's standpoint this is seen as
proportionate learning. What is occurring,
however, is that the neurons, the organism they
integrate, and the environment in which they
interact operate reciprocally as selectors of their
corresponding structural changes and are coupled
with each other structurally: the functioning
organism, including its nervous system, selects the
structural changes that permit it to continue
operating, or it disintegrates.
To an observer", (my emphasis), "the organism
appears as moving proportionately in a changing
environment; and he speaks of learning. To him,
the structural changes that occur in the nervous
system seem to correspond to the circumstances of
the interactions of the organism. In terms of the
nervous system's operation, however, there is only
an ongoing structural drift that follows the course
in which, at each instant, the structural coupling
(adaptation) of the organism to its medium of
interaction is conserved." (Maturana and Varela,
1987, pp.170-171)
"the nervous system ...is not solopsistic, because
as part of [its] organism, it participates in the
interactions [with] its environment. ... Nor is it
representational ... [it] does not 'pick up
information' from the environment, as we often
hear. On the contrary, it brings forth a world by
specifying what patterns of the environment are
perturbations and what changes trigger them in the
organism. The popular metaphor of calling the
brain an 'information-processing device' is not
only ambiguous but patently wrong." (ibid, my
emphasis)
If you have followed me this far, though you may be far
from sympathetic to my thesis as yet, you must at least see
the tremendous difficulty of the purely organizational and
semantic aspects of the task which I have undertaken. I
must argue against all the safe and ordinary paradigms of
reality simultaneously while presenting alternative answers
in a plausible context. The question, and it is not an
easy one, is what should come first? I have concluded that
I should start with the answer before I adequately frame
the problem! Call it a "life preserver" for a jump into
deep and treacherous waters!
Humberto Maturana and Francisco Varela are respected
biologists. Their book, "The Tree of Knowledge", (Maturana
and Varela, 1987), is a detailed and convincing physical
argument against the very possibility of a representative
model of contemporaneous environment in an organism. They
argue, moreover, against "information" itself. They
maintain that information never passes between an organism
and its environment; there is only the "triggering" of
structurally determinate forms. I will detail and extend
their arguments, (in the context of Kant's primeval
problem), in the next chapters, but first I would like to
present a viable alternative to the representative model.
I believe that we as human organisms do, in fact, embody a
model. It is the stuff of mind!
The Schematic Model:
But "representative models" are not the only possible
kinds of models however, nor is representation their only
conceivable use! Consider the models of our prosaic
training seminars, for instance. "'Motivation' plus
'technique' yields 'sales'.", we might hear at a sales
meeting. Or, "'Self-awareness of the masses' informed by
'Marxist-dialectic' produces 'revolution'!", we might hear
from our local revolutionary. Visual aids, (and models),
are ever present. The lecturer stands at the chalkboard
and asks us to accept drawings of triangles, squares,
cookies, horseshoes... as "objects" -with a "calculus" of
relations between them- as standins for concepts or
processes like "motivation", "the nuclear threat",
"sexuality", "productivity", and "evolution". In these
representations, the "objects" do not stand in place of
entities in objective reality, however. (What is a
"productivity" or a "sexuality", for instance?) The
function of the "objects", as objects, in these "schematic
models" is, rather, specifically to illustrate, to enable,
- to crystallize and simplify a "calculus" of relation
between them. The "objects" of these models serve to
organize process, (analysis or response); they are not
representations of actual objects or actual entities in
reality. These "objects" functionally bridge reality in a
way that physical objects do not. The rationale for using
them, (as any good "seminarian" would tell you), is
clarity, organization and efficiency.
Instrumentation and control systems are another example
of the non-representational use of models and "entities".
Their "objects" do not mirror objective reality either. A
gauge, a readout display, a control device, (the "objects"
of such systems), need not mimic a single parameter -or an
actual physical entity. Indeed, in the monitoring of a
complex or critical process, it should not. Rather, the
readout, for instance, should represent an efficacious
synthesis of just those aspects of the process which are
relevant to response, and be "crystallized" around those
relevant responses! A "warning light" or a "status
indicator", for instance, need not refer to just one
parameter. It may refer to electrical overload and/or
excessive pressure and/or... Or it may refer to an optimal
relationship between many parameters -to a relationship
between temperature, volume, mass, etc. in a chemical
process, for instance. The exactly parallel case holds for
its control devices. A single control may orchestrate a
multiplicity of (possibly disjoint) objective responses.
The accelerator pedal in a modern automobile, as a simple
example, may integrate fuel injection volumes, spark
timing, transmission gearing...
A "war room", (a high-tech military command center
resembling a computer game), is a viable, though primitive,
example of such a usage. It is specifically a schematic
model, expressly designed for maximized response. The all-
weather landing display in a jetliner supplies another
example.
The "object" in the graphic user interface, (GUI), of a
computer is perhaps the best example extant. What it
represents and what its manipulation does, at the physical
level, is exceedingly complex and disjoint. The disparate
states of voltages and physical locations represented by a
single "object" and the (possibly different) ones effected
by manipulating it correlate to "an object" only in this
"schematic" sense. Its efficacy lies in the simplicity of
the "calculus" it enables.
Consider, finally, a formal and abstract problem.
Consider the problem of designing instrumentation for the
efficient control of especially complex and dangerous
processes! In the general case, what kind of information
would you want to pass along and how would you best
represent it? How would you design your display and
control system?
It would be impossible, obviously, to represent all
information about the objective physical reality of a,
(any), process or its physical components, (objects).
Where would you stop? Is the color of the building in
which it is housed, the specific materials of which it is
fabricated, that it is effected with gears rather than
levers, -or its location in the galaxy- necessarily
relevant information? (Contrarily, even its designer's
middle name might be relevant if it involved a computer
program and you were considering the possibility of a
hacker's "back door"!) It would be counterproductive even
if you could as relevant data would be obscured and the
"calculus" would be too complex and inefficient for rapid
and effective response. Even the use of realistic
abstractions could produce enormous difficulties in that
you might be interested in many, differing (and possibly
conflicting) significant abstractions and/or their
interrelations. This would produce severe difficulties in
generating an intuitive and efficient "calculus" geared
towards maximal response.
For such a complex and dangerous process, the "entities"
you design must, (1) necessarily, of course, be viable in
relation to both data and control -i.e. they must be
comprehensive in their function. But they would also, (2)
need to be constructed with a primary intent towards
efficiency of response, (rather than realism), as well -the
process is, by stipulation, dangerous! They would need to
be fashioned to optimize the "calculus" while still
fulfilling their (perhaps consequently distributed!)
operative role.
Your "entities" would need to be fabricated in such a
way as to intrinsically define a simple operative
"calculus" of relationality between them -analogous to the
situation in our training seminar. Maximal efficiency,
(and safety), therefore, would demand "crystallization"
into schematic virtual "entities" which would resolve both
demands at a single stroke! Your objects would then
distribute reference so as to concentrate and simplify
function! These virtual entities would be in no
necessarily simple (or hierarchical) correlation with the
objects of physical reality. But they would allow rapid
and effective control of a process which, considered
objectively, might not be simple at all. It is clearly the
optimization of the process of response that is crucial
here, not literal representation. We do not care that the
operator* knows what function(s) he is actually
fulfilling, only that he does it (them) well!
Biological survival is exactly such a problem -it is
both complex and dangerous. It is a moment by moment
confrontation with disaster. It is a schematic model in
just this sense that I propose that evolution constructed,
and it is the basis for both the "percept" and the "mind"!
But it is just the reverse of the argument made above that
I propose for evolution. It is not the distribution of
function, but rather the centralization of disparate
function into efficacious schematic -and virtual- objects
that evolution effected for computational simplicity. The
calculational simplicity of the schematic object for
dealing with a multifarious environment constitutes a clear
and powerful evolutionary rationale. Such a model allows
rapid and efficient response to what cannot be assumed, a
priori, to be a simplistic environment. From the
standpoint of the trillion or so cells that constitute the
human cooperative enterprise, that assumption is
implausible in the extreme!
Do you not find it strange that the fundamental laws of
the sciences, (or of logic), are so few? Or that our
accidentally and evolutionarily acquired logic works so
well to manipulate the objects of our environment? From
the standpoint of Naturalism, this is a subject of wonder -
or at least it should be. It is, in fact, a miracle!
From the standpoint of the schematic model, however, it is
an obvious and necessary consequence. It is precisely the
rationale for the model itself!
Evolution, in dealing with a metacellular organism such
as ours, was confronted with the problem of coordinating
the physical structure of its hundreds of millions of
individual cells. It was also faced with coordinating
their function, the response of this colossus, this "Aunt
Hillary". It had to coordinate their functional
interaction with their environment, raising an
organizational problem of profound proportions.
Evolution was forced to deal with exactly the problem
outlined above. The brain, moreover, is universally
accepted as an evolutionary organ of response. I propose
that a schematic entity, (and its correlative schematic
model), is most credible here -to efficiently orchestrate
the coordination of the ten million sensory neurons with
the one million motor neurons.
A realistic, (i.e. representational), "entity" would demand
a "calculus" embodying the complexity of the objective
reality in which the organism exists.
A measure of the complexity of that reality, however, is
our context of information about it. The only context in
which it has meaning as information for us is of the
magnitude: 2 to the power of 107, (=103,010,290), -the
possible sensory arrays. This is a staggering number!
The number of all the subatomic particles in the entire
known universe, multiplied by the number of seconds in the
4 billion years of evolutionary history is, by comparison,
far less than 10102. The latter number, incidentally, may
be considered as a gross upper bound to evolutionary
possibility! (NOTE: THESE ARE *SUPERSCRIPTS* -AND DID
NOT CONVERT IN THE ASCII TRANSLATION! THIS IS 10 TO
THE 102ND POWER! THERE IS ALSO A SECONDARY ARGUMENT,
CARRIED OUT IN THE FOOTNOTES, WHICH WAS LOST.)
A simple limiting argument:
Maximal assumptions:
a. From the beginning of evolutionary history
there were always less
organisms than subatomic
particles in the known universe
b. Every organism mutated once every second
for this four billion years
c. Every mutation was beneficial
d. Not a single (beneficial) mutation was
lost
e. All mutations were ultimately (somehow)
summed into one organism
Conclusion: the number of total (beneficial)
mutations for the organism named in "e" is
less than 10102.
Assuming a standard bitwise, (i.e. digital), theory of
information, this simple argument demonstrates a
discrepancy of more than just a few orders-of-magnitude
between informational possibility and evolution's ability
to incrementally embody any significant portion of it in an
internal representative model! Even if every single
mutation were model-defining, it is a 3 millions order-of-
magnitude discrepancy! Why so great a discrepancy? How
could "representation" be effected? "Information", (and
"representation" in whatever form), as a rationale for the
evolution of the brain, just isn't a viable hypothesis.
The brain is an organ of (ontogenic) process -of response,
not of "information".
Think about simple digital models. Consider just the
three "idiot lights" on the dashboard of my old truck as a
primitive instance. All eight of its possible states are
relevant to response and, considered as an "information
model", it must account for each of them. OFF-OFF-OFF is
significant -and allows me carefree driving- only in a
context of possibility. In fact one of them, (the oil
light), is non-functional and not "information" at all.
This simple system, in consequence, does not qualify as a
representative model. That part of it that does qualify as
information, insofar as it is "information", requires an
accounting for its context of possibility.
The argument, in brief, is this: a representative model
must account for alternative sensory states. The
hypothesis of an internal representative model as the
rationale for the sensory system presumes an incremental
evolutionary correlation to its context of possibility.
Evolution would have had the problem of progressively
correlating a model with each, (or some significant
portion), of the possibilities of the sensory array -and
with potential response as well.
But evolution had less than 10102 chances to achieve
this correlation. The most optimistic correlation is 10102
instances, and the ratio of model correlation to possible
sensory states is
10102 / 103,010,298 < 1 / 103,000,000 !
Even if the model itself were taken as an edifice of
(107) actual internal binary bits, (paralleling the sensory
array), this would only regress the problem. Evolution
still would have the problem of incrementally correlating
alternative model states with potential response and the
numbers would still stand. The odds of a "designed", or
even a significant response would still be less than 1 /
103,000,000 which is as close to zero as I care to
consider! Its utilization as "information" would still
require an accounting for -and incremental evolutionary
correlation to- its context of possibility. Contrarily,
taking my two proposed, (and grossly exaggerated), upper
bounds for mutational possibility, 10102 and 1010290, the
same informational possibility could be embodied in just
339 or 34,162 binary receptors respectively! Why so many
sensory possibilities?
Paul Churchland argues that if each synapse is capable
of just 10 distinct states, then the brain is capable of 10
to the power of one hundred trillion,
(=10100,000,000,000,000), distinct states. This number is
impressive and considerably larger than the one I am
considering, it is true, but it does not refer to the
possibility of acquisition of information from the
environment nor to the possibility of evolutionary
correlation to beneficial action -i.e. utilization.
Churchland's number, therefore, only amplifies the
discrepancy -and the argument I have made!
But my argument applies equally to the possibility of
even an isomorphic parallelism of response however, (as
distinguished from the existence of an internal,
representative model), as that assumption still requires a
correlation to sensory input! (This is the only "trigger"
that anyone has postulated.) The (maximum) ratio of
"designed" response, (and parallelism), to possible
sensory input is less than 1 / 103,000,000!
It is evolutionarily plausible, certainly, to consider
10,000,000 sensory inputs as triggers of process. But it
is not evolutionarily plausible to think of them as
environmentally determinate -i.e. as inputs of information-
as this immediately escalates the evolutionary problem
exponentially -i.e. to 210,000,000! (TWO TO THE POWER
OF TEN MILLIONS.)
Maturana and Varela's "congruent structural coupling",
Patricia Churchland's "representational structures...
organized to enable informed motor performance", as well as
Dennett's "good trick"and Hofstadter's "software
isomorphism" and, indeed, the whole Naturalist hypothesis
requires that evolution has correlated response
isomorphically to our actual environment -i.e. its
"material" and cause, rather than its effects on us. More
precisely, it now requires that the objects of our
linguistic response embody such an isomorphism. How? It
is a hypothesis of the profoundest difficulty and logically
distinct from the basic operative principle of evolution!
In the next chapter, I will examine the problem in its
abstract, epistemological terms, but the conclusion will be
the same.
Naive-realism, (and Naturalism), as a world-view,
demands our belief because it makes our existence simple
and our "objects" real -really! My hypothesis is
disturbing, however, because it makes them unreal -really!
I propose that our ordinary objects of perception are
convincing, and the relations we find between them simple
precisely because the brain's calculus has been
evolutionarily optimized for them! They are the
utilitarian artifacts effective in our prior evolutionary
history. But now this is changing. They no longer
adequately serve their prior role. The calculus they
optimized can no longer utilize them as proper "objects" in
the larger experience -the experimental and theoretical
context of current science, nor in the technology it
enables. Ordinary objects will not serve quantum physics,
(or the transistor television it generated), -nor do they
allow the explication of the mind-body problem!
I wish to propose the schematic model as a serious
explanation of our perception. Would evolution "equip its
creatures" with a representational model of reality? Could
it? I think the case for a schematic model is the stronger
one. Primitive neural systems are, in point of fact,
operational and reactive rather than representative. The
incremental refinement of an operational, (schematic),
model is, then, linearly consistent with the principles of
evolution. It is a simple consequence of evolutionary
process, -a progressive organization and optimization of
reactive response. The origin of a representative,
(Naturalistic), model, however, involves significant
logical discontinuities. No one credits representative
models to evolutionary primitives. Who will posit such a
model to the nervous system of a hydra or a planarian worm,
for instance? Representationalism must maintain,
therefore, that at some discrete point in evolutionary
history an organism's internal process somehow came to
parallel its environment rather than reacting to it -which
is quite different. This is a very large assumption,
lacking any incremental or physical rationale.
The case for the reactive role of brain throughout
evolution is overwhelming, but nowhere is there any case at
all for a representative role. Indeed, there is not even
a viable conception of such a role -it is the essence of
the mind-body problem itself.*
My hypothesis seems to fit very well with what we know
so far. Do we perceive mathematical magnitudes,
(wavelengths), of light waves or "colors"? Do we perceive
molecular density or "hardness"? Do we perceive mean
molecular energy or "heat"? We are dealing with a model.
I maintain that it is even more of a model than we suspect
-to include our "objects" as well! My conception is a
direct and linear extension of the historical progression
of science away from naive realism. Our sensations are no
longer "knocking at the surface of our brain", but,
rather, affect it at the system level to yield schematic
artifacts -the "objects of perception". The "perceptual
object" is a schematic artifact of process!
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XII. BIBLIOGRAPHY
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1977.
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Werner Heisenberg". New York. W.H. Freeman. 1992
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by William Curtis Swabey). Open Court, 1923
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in "The Philosophy of Ernst Cassirer", New York.
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(Muhaffy translation). Liberal Arts Press, 1950
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(Translation
by Albert E. Blumberg). New York: Springer-Verlag,1974
31. Searle, John. "Is the Brain's Mind a Computer
Program?"
Scientific American, January 1990. Volume 262
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Representation?"
MIND, 101.402, 1992
33. Weyl, Hermann. "David Hilbert and His Mathematical
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Bulletin of the American Mathematical Society 50, 1944.
34. Wilder, Raymond. "Introduction to The Foundations of
Mathematics" John Wiley & Sons, 1967.)
<*>
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